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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate governance failures raise questions by stakeholders seeking explanations 
why audit committees are failing to play their agency role effectively. The objective of 
this study was to determine the relation between 49 disclosed audit committee 
effectiveness variables based on King III Code recommended practices and the 
external audit opinion expressed in South African central government departments. 
Descriptive statistics highlighted variances in 14 variables across 93 departments. 
Categorical principal component analysis categorised the 14 variables into four factor 
variables and hypotheses. Multivariate ordinal logistic regression tested the 
hypotheses. Results suggest that disclosure of a higher number of variables was 
generally associated with a clean audit report, while the association between a higher 
number of disclosures regarding audit committee structure and profile variables and a 
clean audit report was significant. Improvements to National Treasury’s disclosure 
templates and review of departmental managers’ disclosures about audit committees 
in annual reports are recommended.   
 
Keywords: audit committee effectiveness variables, corporate governance, external 
audit opinion, public sector 
 
OPSOMMING 
 
Gevalle van korporatiewe beheer mislukking laat vrae by belanghebbers ontstaan 
waarom ouditkomitees versuim om hul oorsigrol doeltreffend te vervul. Die doel van 
hierdie studie was om te bepaal watter verband daar bestaan tussen 49 vasgestelde 
ouditkomiteedoeltreffendheidsveranderlikes vervat in die aanbevole praktyke volgens 
die King III-kode en die eksterne ouditmening  wat in sentrale staatsdepartemente in 
Suid-Afrika uitgepreek is. Beskrywende statistiek het variasies in 14 veranderlikes oor 
93 departemente uitgewys. Kategoriesebeginsel-komponentontleding het die 14 
veranderlikes in vier faktorveranderlikes en hipoteses gekategoriseer. 
Meerveranderlike ordinale logistieke regressie het die hipoteses getoets. Resultate 
toon dat openbaarmaking van ŉ groter getal veranderlikes oor die algemeen verband 
hou met ŉ skoon ouditverslag; en die verband tussen ŉ groter getal openbaarmakings 
v 
 
betreffende ouditkomiteestruktuur- en profielveranderlikes en ŉ skoon ouditverslag 
was beduidend. Verbeteringe aan Nasionale Tesourie se openbaarmakingstemplet en 
nasiening van departementele bestuurders se openbaarmakings rakende 
ouditkomitees in jaarverslae word aanbeveel.  
 
Sleutelwoord: ouditkomiteedoeltreffendheidsveranderlikes, korporatiewe beheer, 
eksterne ouditmening, openbare sektor 
 
SETSOPOLWA 
 
Go palelwa ga ditshepedišo tšeo di latelwago go laola khamphani go dirile gore 
bengdithoto ba ipotšiše dipotšišo tše di nyakago ditlhalošo tša gore gobaneng dikomiti 
tša tlhakišo di šitwa go kgatha tema ya tšona ya bodiredi ka bokgoni. Maikemišetšo a 
thutelo ye e be e le go šupa tswalano gare ga mabaka ao a ka fetogago a go tliša 
katlego a 49 ao a utollotšwego a komiti ya tlhakišo go ya ka ditlwaelo tše di šišintšwego 
tša King III Code le maikutlo a tlhakišo ya ka ntle ao a filwego ke dikgoro tša mmušo 
wa gare tša Afrika Borwa. Dipalopalo tšeo di fago tlhalošo ya popego ya datha di 
bontšhitše phetogo go mabaka ao a ka fetogago a 14 ka go dikgoro tše 93. 
Tshekatsheko ya karolo ye kgolo ya tlhopho e hlophile mabaka ao a ka fetogago a 14 
go ya ka mabaka ao a ka fetogago le ditlhalošo tše di šišintšwego tše nne. Mokgwa 
wa tshekatsheko ya go fetogafetoga ga didatha go ya ka tatelano goba kgetho o 
dirišitšwe go leka ditlhalošo tše di šišintšwego. Dipoelo di šišintše gore kutollo ya palo 
ya godingwna ya  mabaka ao a ka fetogago ka kakaretšo e tswalane le maikutlo a 
tlhakišo ao a se nago bosodi, gomme tswalano gare ga palo ya godingwana ya 
dikutollo tša mabaka ao a ka fetogago a popego ya komiti ya tlhakišo le profaele le 
maikutlo ao a se nago bosodi e bile bohlokwa. Dikaonafatšo go mokgwatshepedišo 
wa kutollo wa Polokelo ya Bosetšhaba le tekolo ya dikutollo tša bolaodi ka ga dikomiti 
tša tlhakišo ka go dipego tša ngwaga ka ngwaga di a eletšwa.   
 
Mareo a bolhokwa:  mabaka ao a ka fetogago a phethagatošo a komiti ya tlhakišo, 
ditshepedišo tšeo di latelwago go laola khamphani, maikutlo a tlhakišo ya ka ntle, 
lefapha la setšhaba 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
 
Audit committees are a vital corporate governance mechanism. In South Africa, public 
and private sector legislation regulates the establishment and functioning of audit 
committees (RSA 2011a: Section 94(2)1; RSA 2003: Section 166; RSA 1999: Section 
76(d)). An effective audit committee assists the board in discharging its oversight 
responsibilities of financial reporting and assurance processes implemented by 
management, thus ensuring the accountability of management to its stakeholders 
(Qasim 2017:87; Salehi & Shirazi 2016:1646; Madi, Ishakb & Manaf 2015:486; Bédard 
& Gendron 2010:175). National Treasury Regulations require an audit committee 
review and the King Code on Corporate Governance issued in 2009 (King III Code) 
recommends audit committee oversight of financial reporting and assurance 
processes and reporting on their discharge of those duties (IODSA 2009a: Principle 
3.4-3.10; RSA 2005: Section 27.1.8). Ultimately, audit committee effectiveness is 
associated with financial reporting quality (Kibiya, Che-Ahmad & Amran 2016:126; 
Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381; Lin & Hwang 2010:59) and the type of audit opinion 
expressed (Sun 2019:542).  
 
Research supports the value of audit committee effectiveness for restoring the 
confidence of stakeholders in financial reporting and assurance processes. Financial 
reporting failures usually lead to stakeholders questioning the effectiveness of audit 
committees. “Where were the audit committee/auditors?” is the question that often 
follows after a scandal is exposed. Stakeholders seek answers for the shortcomings 
resulting from such scandals (Shbeilat 2014:542; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381); for 
example, the numerous corporate failures witnessed around the world (Qasim 
2017:87; Salehi & Shirazi 2016:1646; Kang, Kilgore & Wright 2011:623; Bédard & 
Gendron 2010:175; Klein 2002:378). 
 
In South Africa, major financial reporting and assurance process failures, for example, 
the African Bank, Steinhoff and VBS Mutual bank (Venda Building Society), saw 
                                            
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008 as amended in 2011 
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stakeholders losing their investments (Rossouw & Styan 2019:163, Khumalo 2018:1; 
Donnelly 2016:1), which resulted from corporate governance failures in the private 
sector. In the public sector, about 166 fraud and corruption cases involving amounts 
between R70 000 – R2.1 billion were reported in the state-owned entities such as 
Transnet, Eskom and the South African Social Security Agency. As a result of the 
fraud and corruption reported in the state-owned entities, a state capture enquiry was 
established to investigate, among others, the possible failures in the corporate 
governance structures (Bhorat, Buthelezi, Chipkin & Peter 2017:14).  
 
South Africa has anti-corruption laws in place (the Prevention and Combatting of 
Corrupt Activities Act No. 12 of 1994, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 
of 1998; the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998), yet these laws did not prevent the 
incidences of corruption. There are still numerous cases of fraud and corruption not 
reported as a result of poor corporate governance (Moyo 2010:102). The Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International, which measures the level of 
public sector corruption worldwide, found that Nigeria and South Africa were among 
countries with serious corruption activities in 2015 (Transparency International 
2015:17). From the CPI, it is thus clear that the mere establishment of audit 
committees does not improve corporate governance as expected. Subsequent reports 
by the CPI has indicated that the level of corruption in South Africa has worsened from 
2015 to 2019 (Transparency International 2019:2; Transparency International 2018:2; 
Transparency International 2017:1; Transparency International 2016:4). The literature 
finds that having an effective audit committee is the primary corporate governance 
mechanism contributing to the quality of financial reporting and assurance processes 
(Qasim 2017:87; Salehi & Shirazi 2016:1646; Madi, Ishakb & Manaf 2015:486; Bedard 
& Gendron 2010:175). As such, an effective audit committee should ensure an 
unqualified opinion with no findings is expressed by the external audit.  
 
1.1.1 Audit committees in South Africa  
 
In South Africa, the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 mandates the establishment of an 
audit committee in every state-owned and listed company (RSA 2011a: Section 94(2)). 
In the public sector, legislation also enforces the establishment of an audit committee 
in the central and local government (RSA 2003: Section 166; RSA 1999: Section 
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76(d)). According to the National Treasury regulations and the Public Finance 
Management Act No. 1 of 1999 (PFMA), the audit committee may be shared by two 
or more departments or institutions (RSA 2005: Section 27.1.2; RSA 1999: Section 
77(c)).  
 
The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IODSA) has been issuing the King reports 
on corporate governance since 1994 (IODSA 1994: no page number). These reports 
were issued in response to the change in the South African political and business 
environment (Vaughn & Ryan 2006:506; Rossouw, Van der Watt & Malan 2002; 
IODSA 1994:43). The King Committee was requested to consider and recommend a 
“Code of Practice on financial aspects of corporate governance in South Africa” 
(IODSA 1994:43), and was established to promote the highest standards of corporate 
governance in South Africa, in the interest of stakeholders (Vaughn & Ryan 2006:506; 
Rossouw et al. 2002:299; IODSA 1994: no page number). The King reports are 
structured in such a way to address the accountability and responsibilities of those 
charged with governance in relation to the auditing and accounting environment. 
These recommendations are established to reduce the agency problems between the 
stakeholders and management by encouraging disclosure of information.  
 
The IODSA published the King Code embedded in the King Report issued in 1994 
(IODSA 1994), 2002 (IODSA 2002), 2009 (IODSA 2009) and 2016 (IODSA 2016). 
Each King report was issued to improve the overall corporate governance guidance in 
South Africa. The King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) adopted the 
‘stakeholders’ approach (Rossouw 2005:98; IODSA 2002:7) and includes a “Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct”, recommending that all stakeholders be involved in 
corporate governance (Afolab 2015:15; IODSA 1994:no page number). The main 
principles in King I recommended the composition, role and responsibilities of the 
board of directors (non-executive) (Afolab 2015:15; Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse 
2001:310). The King Report on Corporate Governance (King II) was an update on 
King I, addressing the changes in the South African environment because of the 
adoption of a new Constitution (Moyo 2010:42; Moloi 2008:54). New sections were 
added in King II, addressing the roles and responsibilities of the board and directors, 
risk management, internal audit, sustainability reporting, accountability and auditing 
(Afolab 2015:12; IODSA 2002; Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse 2001:310-311). King 
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II adopted a ‘comply or explain’ approach, meaning that organisations had to  either 
comply or explain a lack of compliance to King II (Vaughn & Ryan 2006:506). King II 
set out the principles with which all companies should comply or explain in combination 
with statutes, regulations and authoritative directives, the conduct of companies, 
boards and directors. 
 
In September 2009, King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King III) 
and the King III Code were issued, applicable from March 2010 (IODSA 2009a:3). 
King III Code was issued because of the new Companies Act of 2008, and changes 
in the international corporate governance trends (IODSA 2009a:4). The King III Code 
was more of a framework, which only provided a summary of principles and 
recommended practices, while King III provided more details on the principles. In order 
to address the change in principles, the King III and the King III Code moved from the 
‘comply or explain approach’ to a ‘principle-based apply or explain’ approach (Afolab 
2015:15; IODSA 2009a:7). According to King III Code, apply or explain means that 
“the board could decide to apply the recommendation differently or apply another 
practice and still achieve the objective of the overarching corporate governance 
principles of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. Explaining how 
the principles and recommendations were applied, or if not applied, the reasons, 
results in compliance” (IODSA 2009a:6). Organisations should thus explain their 
compliance with the King III Code by disclosing how the principle was applied, or 
explain why the principle was not applied (Afolab 2015:15). Thus, detailed disclosure 
is important as it allows stakeholders an opportunity to understand how the 
organisation has applied the recommendations of the King III Code.  
 
The current King IV Report on Corporate Governance (King IV) was issued on 1 
November 2016, applicable from 1 April 2017 (IODSA 2016:38). King IV sets out the 
“philosophy, principles, practices, and outcomes, which serve as the benchmark for 
corporate governance in South Africa” (IODSA 2016:20). King IV applies to all entities 
regardless of their size or business environment (IODSA 2016:6). Uniquely, King IV 
makes reference to organisations and governing bodies instead of companies and 
boards of directors (IODSA 2016:6). In order for King IV to be understood by all 
organisations, sector supplements were introduced. King IV moved from the ‘apply or 
explain’ to the ‘apply and explain’ approach (IODSA 2016:27). Principles were also 
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reduced from 75 in King III to 17 basic principles in King IV, with 16 of these being 
applicable to all organisations (IODSA 2016:7). Applying all the principles in the King 
codes is a prerequisite for claiming that good corporate is being practised (IODSA 
2016:7). Thus, every principle is equally important as the principles in combination 
form a ‘holistic approach to governance’ (IODSA 2009a:16). Organisations are 
therefore expected to disclose to their stakeholders whether they have applied – and 
explain how they have applied – the principles of King IV. This study used the 
principles and recommended practices in the King III Code (IODSA 2009a) as audit 
committee effectiveness variables as those applied to the annual reports for the 
2014/15 financial year; the latter constitute the publicly available data employed by 
this study.  
 
The King reports may apply on a voluntary basis, as a leading practice or statutory 
requirement (IODSA 2016:35). For instance, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
requires all South African listed companies to comply with the recommendations of 
the King reports (JSE 2014: Section 7.F.5). The South African public sector may 
comply with the recommendations and principles of the King reports on a voluntary 
basis; however, some of the governance principles have been legislated in parallel 
with the King Code (IODSA 2016:35). In instances where legislation and the King 
reports differ, the law takes preference (IODSA 2016:35). For the purposes of this 
study, the absence of disclosures or explanations in annual reports in terms of King III 
Code principles is considered.  
 
The South African King reports and codes are regarded as corporate governance best 
practice by many scholars (Coetzee & Msiza 2018:89; Atkins, Solomon, Norton & 
Joseph 2015:30). In their study, Coetzee and Erasmus (2019:7) referred to King III as 
the “best practice of its time”. To enhance audit committee effectiveness, the audit 
committee should adopt good governance practices such as the King Report 
principles (Morgan 2010:96). Audit committees’ performance could be improved by 
comparing their practices with those of other audit committees and good business 
practices (Morgan 2010:96).  
 
Turning to the South African public sector, legislation, including National Treasury 
Regulations, incorporate only 44.7% of the recommended practices mentioned in the 
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King III Code dealing with audit committees (Coetzee & Erasmus 2019:7). It is 
therefore clear that the King III Code (IODSA 2009a) contains more detailed 
recommendations about audit committees than the public sector legislation. However, 
it can be argued that King III was issued 10 years after the PFMA was promulgated 
and four years after the National Treasury Regulations were last amended. Not all 
principles in the King reports are included in public sector legislation are applicable to 
public sector organisations. For instance, the King III Code states in principle 3.4 that 
the audit committee should oversee integrated reporting (IODSA 2009a) and in 
principle 3.9 that the audit committee is responsible for recommending the 
appointment of the external auditor (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.9.1). 
However, in the central government departments (in this study, this term is used when 
referring to the national and provincial government departments as a unit), integrated 
reporting is not a legislated requirement, and legislation stipulates that the Auditor-
General of South Africa (AGSA) should perform external audits (RSA 2018: Chapter 
2 (4)(1)). 
 
1.1.2 Challenges faced by South African public sector audit committees  
 
Despite the existence of the King III Code best practice principles and legislation 
prescribing the establishment and functioning of audit committees, the South African 
public sector is still faced with numerous scandals and challenges resulting from 
corruption and bribery (Afolabi 2015:10). The South African Public Sector Audit 
Committee Forum (PSACF) alleged legislation and regulatory requirements are not 
always clear in defining the requirements for audit committees in relation to the public 
sector environment (PSACF 2014:7). 
 
Some of the problems highlighted by the forum include that responsibilities for the 
appointment of and the reporting lines of audit committees are vague. In some cases, 
audit committees are appointed by the accounting officers, and in others, the ministers 
are also involved; this creates confusion about the reporting lines of audit committees 
(PSACF 2014:7). The composition of the audit committee has also been regarded as 
one of the challenges faced by public sector audit committees. For instance, the 
independence of the audit committee may be compromised due to past and present 
alliances of members (PSACF 2014:8). The shortage of members with appropriate 
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knowledge, skills and experience to serve on public sector audit committees was 
another challenge (PSACF 2014:8). Furthermore, some audit committee members 
lack adequate commitment and dedication in preparing for meetings (PSACF 2014:8). 
In addition, management adds to the dilemmas faced by audit committees in the public 
sector, due to the absence of quality information being made available to them, making 
it difficult for audit committees to fulfil their duties (PSACF 2014:8). The challenges 
faced by the public sector audit committees result in these committees being 
ineffective (Dintwe 2016:228). 
 
Few studies have been conducted in South Africa on audit committees’ effectiveness 
and related disclosures in annual reports. For instance, in the private sector, Marx 
(2009:31) found that reporting on the responsibilities performed by the audit committee 
was of a poor standard in the annual reports and did not reflect that the audit 
committees were discharging their duties. Similarly, Moloi (2015:67) found that 
disclosure in the annual reports lacked transparency regarding the role of audit 
committees in the South African national government departments. Van Der Nest 
(2008:545) found that the majority of audit committees in the South African public 
sector were not perceived as ineffective. However, accounting officers and audit 
committee chairpersons perceived that audit committees could perform certain key 
functions more effectively (van der Nest 2008:556). None of these studies considered 
the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the 
external audit opinion expressed. This study addresses this gap in knowledge.  
 
1.1.3 External audit opinions and financial reporting quality in South African 
public sector  
 
In the South African public sector, the AGSA has a sole mandate to audit the public 
sector, however, audits may be outsourced to private auditing firms (AGSA 2018:123). 
The AGSA (2019:1) described the objective of an audit of financial statements as “to 
express an audit opinion on whether the financial statements fairly present the 
financial position of auditees at financial year-end and the results of their operations 
for that financial year”. The AGSA could express any of the following types of audit 
opinions: an unqualified opinion with no findings; an unqualified opinion with findings; 
a qualified opinion; an adverse audit opinion, or a disclaimer of audit opinion. “An 
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unqualified opinion with no findings means that the financial statements are free from 
material misstatements (in other words, a financially unqualified audit opinion) and 
there are no material findings on reporting on performance objectives or non-
compliance with legislation” (AGSA 2019:1). In laymen’s terms, an unqualified opinion 
with no findings means “that everything is correct” (Ngoepe & Ngulube 2016:894). An 
unqualified opinion with no findings is also referred to as a “clean audit outcome”, or 
an “unmodified audit opinion with no findings” (Ngoepe & Ngulube 2016:894; AGSA 
2015a:26). According to Kamolsakulchai (2015:328), unqualified audit opinion 
“indicates that financial reporting was prepared according to generally accepted 
accounting standards”, implying that the higher the financial reporting quality, the 
greater the likelihood for an organisation to obtain an unqualified audit opinion.  
 
An unqualified opinion with findings means that “the financial statements contain no 
material misstatements. However, findings have been raised on either reporting on 
predetermined objectives or non-compliance with legislation, or both these aspects” 
(AGSA 2019:1). An unqualified opinion with no findings is also referred to as a 
financially unqualified opinion with findings, an unmodified audit opinion with findings, 
or an unqualified opinion with an emphasis of matter (Ngoepe & Ngulube 2016:894; 
AGSA 2015a:26). From this definition, one can conclude that an unqualified opinion 
with no findings implies that financial reporting quality is high and public funds were 
managed properly. Thus, it is the goal of any government department to obtain an 
unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
A qualified audit opinion is defined as “the financial statements contain material 
misstatements in specific amounts, or there is insufficient evidence to conclude that 
specific amounts included in the financial statements are not materially misstated” 
(AGSA 2019:1). A qualified audit opinion is also referred to as a modified audit opinion. 
An adverse audit opinion refers to “financial statements that contain material 
misstatements that are not confined to specific amounts, or the misstatements 
represent a substantial portion of the financial statements” (AGSA 2019:1), and 
indicates that the auditors had a disagreement with management about the fair 
presentation of the financial statements (Ngoepe & Ngulube 2016:894). Disclaimer of 
audit opinion means that “the auditee provided insufficient evidence in the form of 
documentation on which to base an audit opinion. The lack of sufficient evidence is 
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not confined to specific amounts, or represents a substantial portion of the information 
contained in the financial statements” (AGSA 2019:1). A disclaimer of audit opinion is 
thus an indication of a lack of supporting audit evidence to the extent that the auditors 
are unable to make a reasonable conclusion of material matters (Ngoepe & Ngulube 
2016:894). It is critical for the public sector to ensure that it avoids qualified, adverse 
and disclaimer audit opinions so that it might not damage stakeholders’ confidence, 
since these types of audit opinions may indicate mismanagement of public funds and 
poor financial reporting quality.  
 
According to Ngoepe and Ngulube (2016:892), an audit opinion enhances the integrity 
of the financial statements but does not guarantee future viability, efficiency or 
effectiveness of the management process. Thus, an unqualified opinion with no 
findings does not mean that there are no issues in the organisation but merely 
indicates fair presentation in all material respects of the organisation’s financial 
performance and position. The audit opinion has been used to address hypotheses in 
many studies (Kamolsakulchai 2015:331; Omid 2015:50; Pucheta-Martínez & García-
Meca 2014:347). For the purpose of this study, the five types of audit opinions 
discussed above served as dependent variables, as these are proxies of the financial 
reporting quality achieved through audit committee effectiveness (Sun 2019:542; 
Kibiya, Che-Ahmad & Amran 2016:126; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381; Lin & Hwang 
2010:59).  
 
There is growing literature embracing the positive relationship between financial 
reporting quality and the external audit opinion, indicating that a higher quality of 
financial reports increases the likelihood of the organisation receiving an unqualified 
audit opinion (Omid 2015:46; Pucheta-Martínez & García-Meca 2014:347). However, 
most of these studies were conducted in the private sector with limited research in the 
public sector. Studies that were conducted in the South African public sector primarily 
focused on audit committee effectiveness (Motubatse 2018:533; Motubatse & 
Mashele 2018:593; Dintwe 2016:217; Marx 2009:31). These studies did not examine 
the relation between audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit 
opinion expressed. This study addresses this gap in knowledge.  
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
Legislation and corporate governance principles enforce and/or recommend the 
establishment and functioning of audit committees. However, it appears that audit 
committees within the South African central government departments do not 
contribute as expected to corporate governance aspects such as risk management, 
internal controls and quality financial reporting, to name a few. Evidence of the latter 
is in the 2015 Global Competitiveness Index, which finds South Africa 89th out of 144 
countries in relation to the wastefulness of government spending (Schwab 2015:23). 
This indicates transgressions of applicable legislation, including the PFMA and the 
National Treasury Regulations (Schwab 2015:23). In the 2016-17 financial year, South 
Africa was ranked 88th out of 138 countries, reflecting the countries’ relative regress 
in the extent of wasteful government spending (Scwab 2018:325). Similarly, South 
Africa’s position worsened further in 2019, evident by ranking 103rd out of 138 
countries for the efficiency of government spending (Schwab 2019:269). 
 
In contrast to the increasing trend in wasteful and inefficient government spending 
highlighted by the Global Competitiveness Indexes from 2015 to 2019, the central 
government departments’ audit outcomes improved in the 2014/15 financial year as 
presented in the AGSA reports. The AGSA was of the opinion that audit committees 
were the key contributors to improved audit opinions (AGSA 2015a:28). For example, 
the AGSA cited that audit committees’ oversight contributed to the adequacy, reliability 
and accuracy of the financial and performance information used by other role players, 
e.g. internal audit, accounting officers, senior management, and executive authorities, 
which contributed to improved audits (AGSA 2015d:109-110).  
 
The AGSA assessed that audit committees had a positive impact on audit outcomes 
for approximately 65% of auditees (central government departments and public 
entities), over the period 2013/14-2016/17 (AGSA 2017:147). This is reflected in the 
fact that only 29% (47 of 163) of the central government departments obtained 
unqualified opinion with no findings for the 2014/15 financial period. As highlighted in 
the previous section, there is a gap in knowledge about the relation between disclosed 
audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed in 
South African central government departments. Considering the vital role of the audit 
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committee in overseeing financial reporting and assurance processes, and the link 
between financial reporting quality and the external audit opinion expressed, this study 
addresses the following research problem: 
 
The relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the 
external audit opinion expressed in South African central government departments 
is unclear.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM, OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The aim of this study was to determine the relation between disclosed audit committee 
effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed in South African 
central government departments. In order to operationalise this aim, the primary and 
secondary objectives of this study were: 
 
Primary objective:  
 
1. To determine the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and the external audit opinion expressed in the South African central 
government departments. 
 
Secondary objectives:  
 
1. To analyse the King III Code for variables associated with audit committee 
effectiveness.  
2. To analyse annual reports of central government departments for the disclosure 
or non-disclosure of variables associated with audit committee effectiveness 
(as identified in secondary objective 1).  
 
As explained in Section 4.2.1, the following four hypotheses were used for further data 
analysis (categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA)) when measuring the 
relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the external 
audit opinion expressed: 
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H1 There is a positive association between AC2 statutory reporting oversight 
and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
H2 There is a positive association between AC risk and control oversight and 
an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
H3 There is a positive association between AC assurance effectiveness 
oversight and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
H4 There is a positive association between AC structure and profile and an 
unqualified opinion with no findings. 
 
1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
As discussed in Section 1.1, there is limited research on the relation between 
disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion 
(dependent variable) expressed in the South African central government departments. 
The study contributes to this body of knowledge. The results of this study should be of 
interest to public sector audit committees, the public sector audit committee forum and 
the National Treasury as they each play a key role in audit committee effectiveness. 
This study builds on previous research that reported an effective audit committee is 
associated with higher financial reporting quality (Kibiya, Che-Ahmad & Amran 
2016:126; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381; Lin & Hwang 2010:59), and higher financial 
reporting quality is associated with an unqualified audit opinion (Sun 2019:542; 
Kamolsakulchai 2015:328). However, Sun (2019:542) did not make a distinction 
between different types of unqualified audit opinions. This study therefore focuses on 
unqualified opinions with no findings. The disclosure on audit committees’ activities is 
critical in providing the users of the annual reports with an understanding of what the 
audit committees were actually doing, and whether they were doing what was 
expected of them or doing more. Furthermore, the application of all the principles in 
the King reports and codes is critical when claiming good corporate governance is 
                                            
2 The abbreviation AC for audit committee was used when referring to research hypotheses, audit 
committee variables, factors and related discussion.  
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being practised (IODSA 2016:7). Thus, complete disclosure of audit committees’ 
characteristics and oversight of financial reporting and assurance processes 
enhances stakeholders’ confidence in the effectiveness of audit committees as 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
1.5 DELIMITATIONS  
 
This study is confined to the public sector, specifically the audit committees of the 
South African central government departments. The primary objective of this study 
was to determine the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and the external audit opinion expressed in South African central 
government departments. The study analysed the annual reports of departments for 
the disclosure and non-disclosure of audit committee effectiveness variables, as 
identified in the King III Code (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.1-3.10). This study sampled 
all the national government departments (38) and 55 provincial departments selected 
from four provinces: Gauteng, Limpopo, North West and Western Cape. The annual 
reports for the 2014-15 financial year were analysed, being the latest available annual 
reports at the time when the analysis was done at the inception of the study. 
 
Only chapter 3 of the King III Code was analysed for principles and recommended 
practices containing audit committee effectiveness variables. The King III Code was 
the applicable corporate governance code when the study commenced in 2016. 
Adherence to the King III Code is not mandatory for the South African central 
government departments, thus non-disclosure of audit committee effectiveness 
variables does not necessarily imply non-compliance with laws and regulations. The 
disclosure of some King III Code audit committee effectiveness variables will be an 
indication of voluntary disclosure by the department. Moreover, some King III Code 
audit committee effectiveness variables are subsumed in legislation (IODSA 2016:35). 
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1.6 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS  
 
Accounting officer:  
(a) the head of a central government department is the accounting officer for the 
department, and  
(b) “the chief executive officer of a constitutional institution is the accounting officer for 
that institution” (RSA 1999: Section 36(2a-b)).  
 
Adverse audit opinion:  
“The financial statements contain material misstatements that are not confined to 
specific amounts, or the misstatements represent a substantial portion of the financial 
statements” (AGSA 2019:1).  
 
Apply or explain:  
“The board could decide to apply the recommendation differently or apply another 
practice and still achieve the objective of the overarching corporate governance 
principles of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. Explaining how 
the principles and recommendations were applied, or if not applied, the reasons results 
in compliance” (IODSA 2009a:6). 
 
Assurance providers:  
These are both internal and external assurance providers. The assurance providers 
include, but are not limited to, the external auditors, internal auditors and risk 
management (IODSA 2009b:62-66). 
 
Central government departments:  
In this study, this term is used when referring to the national and provincial government 
departments as a unit.  
 
Corporate governance:  
“Mainly involves the establishment of structures and processes, with appropriate 
checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their legal responsibilities and 
oversee compliance with legislation. In addition to compliance with legislation, the 
criteria of good governance, governance codes and guidelines will be relevant to 
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determine what is regarded as an appropriate standard of conduct for directors”  
(IODSA 2009a:6-7). 
 
Department:  
“Means a national or provincial department or a national or provincial government 
component” (RSA 1999:6). 
 
Disclaimer of audit opinion:  
“The auditee provided insufficient evidence in the form of documentation on which to 
base an audit opinion. The lack of sufficient evidence is not confined to specific 
amounts or represents a substantial portion of the information contained in the 
financial statements” (AGSA 2019:1). 
 
Executive authority: 
(a) “In relation to a national department, means the Cabinet member who is 
accountable to Parliament for that department; 
(b) In relation to a provincial department, means the member of the Executive 
Council of a province who is accountable to the provincial legislature for that 
department [Definition of ‘executive authority’ substituted by s. 1 (b) of Act No. 
29 of 1999.]” (RSA 1999:6-7). 
 
The executive authority is equivalent to the board of directors in the private sector 
(PSACF 2014:2). Executive authority is also referred to as a “relevant governing body” 
(PSACF 2014:2).  
 
Factor variables:  
In this study, the term refers to the new independent variables that were formed using 
the CATPCA statistical technique. This technique reduced the individual variables.  
 
Individual variables:  
In this study, the term ‘individual variables’ refer to the 49 individual audit committee 
effectiveness variables identified from chapter 3 of King III Code. 
 
Qualified Audit Opinion:  
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“The financial statements contain material misstatements in specific amounts, or there 
is insufficient evidence to conclude that specific amounts included in the financial 
statements are not materially misstated” (AGSA 2019:1) 
 
Relevant treasury:  
Means the National Treasury unless delegated in terms of section 10(1) (b) of the Act 
(RSA 1999). 
 
Stakeholders:  
“Any person or group who has an interest in or is affected, even unwittingly, by a 
particular issue” (RSA 2000:83). 
 
Unqualified opinion with findings:  
“The financial statements contain no material misstatements. Unless we express a 
clean audit outcome, findings have been raised on either reporting on predetermined 
objectives or non-compliance with legislation, or both these aspects” (AGSA 2019:1). 
 
Unqualified opinion with no findings (clean audit outcome):  
“The financial statements are free from material misstatements (in other words, a 
financially unqualified audit opinion) and there are no material findings on reporting on 
performance objectives or non-compliance with legislation” (AGSA 2019:1). 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study employed a quantitative approach to address the primary objective. A 
content analysis was used as the method for document analysis (Bowen 2009:28). 
Document analysis is a process of reviewing and evaluating printed and electronic 
documents (Bowen 2009:27). According to Elo and Kyngäs (2008:107), content 
analysis is a method that may be used with either qualitative or quantitative data and 
in an inductive or deductive way. The content analysis method was appropriate as it 
allowed the researcher to analyse the King III Code and annual reports for the 
information pertaining to the audit committee effectiveness variables (Hsieh & 
Shannon 2005:5). 
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The content of annual reports for the central government departments and chapter 3 
of the King III Code were analysed. First, the content of chapter 3 of the King III Code 
were analysed to identify audit committee effectiveness variables. A Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet with 49 audit committee variables was created- this was used when 
analysing annual reports. Then, the content of the central government departments’  
annual reports were analysed for disclosure and non-disclosure of those audit 
committee effectiveness variables in annual reports.  
 
A purposive sampling approach was employed to select 93 South African central 
government departments for this study. All 38 South African national departments and 
553 departments from four provinces were selected. The four provinces were selected 
based on the tendency of the types of audit opinion obtained in the 2014/15 financial 
year. The Gauteng and Western Cape provincial departments were selected due to 
having the most unqualified opinions with no findings. The Limpopo and North West 
provincial departments were selected, as they had the least unqualified opinions with 
no findings. The sample thus allowed coverage of different audit committees under 
different circumstances, including different types of audit opinions.  
 
The annual reports were downloaded from the national and provincial departments’ 
websites, and analysed for the disclosure of audit committee effectiveness variables; 
the analyses were recorded on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The disclosure of each 
audit committee effectiveness variable was coded as 1, and non-disclosure as -1. The 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to conduct the 
descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies, distinguishing variables with and 
without variation (Phase 1), reduce variables with variation into factor variables and 
their related hypotheses using CATPCA (Phase 2), and finally, to perform a 
multivariate ordinal logistic regression analysis to test the four hypotheses dealing with 
the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the 
external audit opinion expressed (Phase 3).  
 
                                            
3 In 2014/15 the North West province had 13 departments. The researcher omitted the department of 
Economic and Enterprise development from this study by mistake. This department obtained an 
unqualified audit opinion with findings, as 1  of the 10 other departments. The omission of this 
department did not materially affect the results of this study.  
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1.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION  
 
Ethical clearance to conduct this research was granted by the University of South 
Africa (UNISA) for the use of secondary data obtained from the central government 
departments’ websites. Secondary data can be defined as earlier primary data that 
were created by other users for a different purpose than the research question at hand 
(Hox & Boeije 2005:596; Cowton 1998:424). Thus, the annual reports compiled by the 
relevant departments for the purpose of reporting their financial and non-financial 
affairs to relevant stakeholders are considered as secondary data. The research ethics 
clearance for this study was obtained from UNISA before the data were collected in 
June 2016. Specifically, approval was obtained from the Research Ethics Review 
Committee within the College of Accounting Sciences on the 8th of June 2016 with 
reference number 2016_CAS_028.  
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
 
This study comprises of five chapters, with content as indicated below:  
 
Chapter 1 introduces and highlights the problem statement. The aim and research 
objectives of the study are described, and the importance and delimitations of the 
study are discussed. In addition, the key terms used in this study are listed and 
defined, and the research methodology and ethical considerations are highlighted.  
 
Chapter 2 contextualises the study in the existing literature, focusing on audit 
committee characteristics, and oversight of financial reporting and assurance 
processes as variable commonly used as proxies of audit committee effectiveness.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the research process followed in this study, which includes a 
discussion on the research philosophy, followed by the research design and the 
research methods. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the research results.  
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Chapter 5 outlines the conclusion of the study. This chapter reflects on the significant 
results that relate to the objectives of the study, as well as the limitations of the study, 
and subsequently, make recommendations for further research.  
 
1.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the study. A brief general and South African background on audit 
committees was provided. The literature on the dependent variable used in this study, 
namely the external audit opinion expressed as a proxy for financial reporting quality, 
was also considered. Moreover, the challenges faced by the South African public 
sector audit committees were highlighted. These discussions led to the identification 
of the research problem, followed by the aim and primary and secondary objectives of 
this study. The primary objective was to determine the relation between disclosed audit 
committee effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed in the 
South African central government departments. 
 
The importance of the study, delimitations, definition of key terms, brief research 
methodology, ethical considerations and the structure of the study were also 
discussed.  
 
In the next chapter, an overview of the literature on audit committee characteristics 
and oversight of financial reporting and assurance processes as proxies of audit 
committee effectiveness are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
In Chapter 1, the study was introduced, and in Chapter 2, an overview of relevant 
literature is provided. The agency theory as a theoretical framework, proxies of audit 
committee effectiveness and audit committee effectiveness disclosure literature are 
discussed. Audit committee effectiveness characteristics and oversight of financial 
reporting and assurance processes are presented as sub-sections of the audit 
committee effectiveness.  
 
2.2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: AGENCY THEORY  
 
This section provides an overview of agency theory as the theoretical framework 
followed in this study. Due to the separation of power between owners and 
management, the board of directors assumes a vital role in overseeing the governance 
of the organisation (L’Huillier 2014:305). Jensen and Meckling (1976:305) argued that 
the separation of ownership and control creates the agency problem, where 
management tends to put their interests before that of the shareholders. Since the 
shareholders are outside the organisation, it creates an agency problem due to 
information asymmetry (Lin & Hwang 2010:59). As a result, corporate governance 
mechanisms were introduced to reduce agency problems between managers (agents) 
and shareholders (principals) (Inaam & Khamoussi 2016:142; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 
2013:382; Lin & Hwang 2010:58). The challenge is that there are no generally 
recognised terminology for shareholders and the board of directors  in the public sector 
(Dawson, Denford, Williams, Preston & Desouza 2016:1186). Therefore, it is essential 
to first determine who the shareholder and the board of directors are in the public 
sector. The PSACF (2014:2) suggested that the board of directors are equivalent to 
the executive authority. Thus, the executive authority – being the president, cabinet 
members or deputy ministers – can be used as a proxy of the board of directors. Both 
the board of directors and the executive authority has the role of acting as mediators 
between the shareholders and the management.  
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Similarly, the term ‘shareholders’ does not exist in the public sector. According to 
Dawson et al. (2016:1186), the shareholders are equivalent to the government 
organisation; for example, the presidency or a ministry as government organisations 
have legal personality. However, the executive authority and government organisation 
leaders are the same persons. Thus, for the purpose of this study, the general public 
will be referred to as the shareholders of central government departments. The 
management (agents), on the other hand, are still referred to as management in the 
public sector (Dawson et al. 2016:1184). Furthermore, corporate governance 
mechanisms are the same in both the public and the private sector. Corporate 
governance “mainly involves the establishment of structures and processes, with 
appropriate checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their legal 
responsibilities and oversee compliance with legislation”  (IODSA 2009a:6).  
 
According to Lin and Hwang (2010:56), there is no generally accepted definition of 
corporate governance, but it might be defined as a “system consisting of people, 
processes and activities to help ensure stewardship over an entity’s assets”. Other 
authors indicated that corporate governance entails the relationships between the 
board of directors, management, shareholders and other stakeholders (Kibiya et al. 
2016:126). Thus, corporate governance mechanisms are crucial in ensuring that 
management in the public sector is held accountable for their decisions (Ghafran & 
O’Sullivan 2013:382; Lin & Hwang 2010:58). The corporate governance mechanisms 
can be referred to as the agency cost that is incurred by the general public (through 
the payment of tax) in monitoring the management activities. The agency costs are 
defined as the sum of the costs that the principal incurs in monitoring the agent’s 
bonding expenditure and any remaining residual losses (Hill 1992:132).  
 
A good corporate governance structure in the public sector environment ensures that 
the management utilises public resources in the best interest of the general public, 
and fairly reports the financial position and performance of the state institution. Thus, 
it is crucial that agency mechanisms are introduced to mitigate agency problems, such 
as manipulation or misstatements of financial information. The executive authority 
(equivalent to the board of directors in the private sector) therefore delegates some of 
its responsibilities to sub-committees, such as the audit committee, in order to reduce 
agency problems. The existence of the audit committee is to protect the interest of the 
22 
 
general public by providing oversight in the areas of financial reporting, internal control 
and external audit activities (Ika & Mohd Ghazali 2012:408; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson & Neal 2009:71; Turley & Zaman 2004:133; DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault & Reed 2002:40). Similar to audit committees, the internal auditors and 
external auditors are also referred to as corporate governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, this study employed the agency theory in explaining the relation between 
audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed as 
a proxy for financial reporting quality. In the next section, variables used as proxies of 
audit committee effectiveness will be discussed.  
 
2.3  AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
 
According to the Internal Audit Framework of National Treasury, the audit committee 
should serve as an independent corporate governance mechanism to oversee the 
financial reporting and assurance processes (RSA 2009:5). An audit committee that 
adheres to King III Code recommended practices and legislative requirements in 
relation to independence, financial expertise, number of meetings, size and the chair 
of the audit committee is expected to function effectively. Research has revealed that 
the effectiveness of the audit committee depends on these characteristics (Buallay 
2018:185; Madi et al. 2015:487; Othman, Ishak, Arif & Aris 2014:331).  
 
Prior literature has refined and motivated variables for audit committee effectiveness. 
DeZoort et al. (2002:41) defined “An effective audit committee has qualified members 
with the authority and resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable 
financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through its diligent 
oversight efforts”. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2002:56) proposed an effective 
audit committee is “one that is independent of management’s influence and one that 
understands the financial reporting process”. For example, audit committee 
effectiveness enhances the quality of financial reporting (Kibiya et al. 2016:126; 
Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381). Similarly, the individual audit committee 
characteristics have the potential of improving the quality of financial reports. 
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2.3.1  Audit committee characteristics 
 
This section presents an overview of the literature on audit committee characteristics 
and the impact of these characteristics on financial reporting quality. The 
characteristics of the audit committee members are widely regarded as variables of 
the audit committee effectiveness. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study addresses 
audit committee effectiveness from the perspective of the King III Code. Firstly, an 
effective audit committee should only consist of independent non-executive directors 
(IODSA 2009a: Recommended practices 3.2.1). Secondly, the audit committee 
members should be suitably skilled and experienced (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.2). 
Thirdly, the audit committee should meet as often (at least twice a year) as necessary 
in order to effectively execute their duties (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practices 
3.1.4). Fourthly, the audit committee should consist of at least three members to 
sufficiently execute their duties (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practices 3.2.2). 
Lastly, the audit committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive 
director who is not the chair of the board (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practices 
3.2.3). 
 
The establishment of the audit committee as a corporate governance mechanism has 
been suggested as a driver for financial reporting quality and an unqualified audit 
opinion (Sun 2019:542; Haji 2015:761). As discussed in Section 1.1, the external audit 
opinion is used as a proxy for financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3.1.1  Independent audit committee 
 
The independence of audit committee members and the definition of an ‘independent 
non-executive director as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness’ is discussed in 
this section. Thereafter, a discussion on the impact of audit committee members who 
are independent non-executive directors on financial reporting quality follows. An 
independent audit committee is viewed as an important characteristic of audit 
committee effectiveness, as it enhances the overall effectiveness of the audit 
committee (Moses 2019:39; Qasim 2017:105; Madi et al. 2015:490; Othman et al. 
2014:331; Sun, Lan & Liu 2014:155; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381). The King III 
Code defines independence as “the absence of undue influence and bias which can 
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be affected by the intensity of the relationship between the director and the company” 
(IODSA 2009a:52). In addition, King III requires “Independent non-executive directors 
to be independent in fact and in the perception of a reasonably informed outsider” 
(IODSA 2009b:38). In the South African public sector, the audit committee members 
are expected to be independent of the department, and should preferably not be public 
servants (PSACF 2017:3; RSA 2009: Section 2.5.4). The literature defines 
‘independence’ as the absence of management influence on audit committee roles 
and responsibilities (Kusnadi, Leong, Suwardy & Wang 2016:197; Klein 2002:375). In 
order to safeguard the independence of the audit committee, independent directors 
are assumed to be persons of high calibre with strong incentives to monitor the 
financial reporting process (Wu, Hsu & Haslam 2016:241).  
 
A non-executive director who is free from any interest position has no material 
relationship that might influence his/her capacity to be objective and act in the best 
interest of the stakeholders; such a director is also regarded as independent (IODSA 
2016:13; ASX 2014:37; IODSA 2009b: Principle 2.18 No 66). Non-executive directors 
are referred to as non-executive members in the public sector (PSACF 2017:2). 
Furthermore, any director who is a material supplier or customer of the organisation 
in question, including their relatives/families, should not be appointed as an audit 
committee member (PSACF 2017:2; IIA 2014:12; IODSA 2009b: Principle 2.18 No 
67.7; FRC 2014: B.1.1; RSA 2011a: Section 94(4)(c); RSA 2011a: Section 94(4)(b) 
(iii)). The King III also excludes the professional adviser to the company or the 
organisation from serving as an audit committee member (IODSA 2009b: Principle 
2.18 No 67.6). Previous external audit partners of the appointed audit firm, current 
partners in the organisation’s external audit firm, or senior legal adviser in the 
preceding three financial years are also excluded (IODSA 2009b: Principle 2.18 No 
67.6). In addition, audit committee members should not have had any of their 
immediate family members in employment in an executive capacity in the organisation 
during the preceding three years (IODSA 2009b: Principle 2.18 No 67.4). Thus, it is 
recommended that the audit committee’s independence be reviewed annually to 
ensure their independence (Deloitte 2017:11).  
 
The King III Code recommends that all members of the audit committee should be 
independent, non-executive directors (IODSA 2009a: Recommended principle 3.2.1). 
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The National Treasury Regulations require that the audit committee be constituted to 
ensure their independence (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.5). Despite global efforts to 
improve audit committee independence, the South African public sector has less strict 
rules in relation to audit committee independence. For instance, the PFMA and the 
MFMA have not made reference to audit committee independence, yet it is implied. 
For instance, the PFMA and the MFMA require that the majority of audit committee 
members must not be in the employment of the department, public entity or 
municipality/municipal entity, except with the approval of the National Treasury 
(PSACF 2017:2; RSA 1999: Section 77(a) (ii); RSA 2003: Section 166(4)). Similarly, 
the chair of the audit committee should not be in the employment of the department, 
implying that the chair should be independent (RSA 1999: Section 77(a) (iii)). 
 
The PFMA also requires at least one audit committee member to be employed outside 
the public service (RSA 1999: Section 77(a) (i)). It is clear that the PFMA does not 
require all audit committee members to be independent; however, it only implies that 
the audit committee may have some (not all) members not employed by the 
department. Conversely, the Companies Act requires all members of the audit 
committee to be non-executive directors. A non-executive member is any person not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the business or employed by the company (RSA 
2011a: Section 94(4)(b) (i)). Despite the public sector’s efforts to have independent 
audit committee members, the South African public sector is still faced with a lack of 
independent audit committee members (Dintwe 2016:220). However, Moloi (2015:81) 
found that audit committee members disclosed in the annual reports were considered 
as independent. It can be expected that the South African public sector audit 
committees should consist of only independent non-executive members, in line with 
the King III Code requirements.  
 
The research highlights several benefits arising from the independence of the audit 
committee. Thus, it can be expected that an audit committee member who is an 
independent non-executive director is able to attract vital resources and assist 
management in utilising those resources sufficiently to improve an organisation’s 
sustainability strategy and reporting (Al-Shaer & Zaman 2018:3). An independent non-
executive audit committee is also likely to protect financial reporting quality by 
mitigating management’s interests, due to their independence of mind (Moses 
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2019:38). The studies point out that audit committee independence is reliant on board 
independence (Klein 2002:398; Menon & Deahl Williams 1994:121). Independent 
audit committees are also key to upholding the integrity and credibility of published 
financial statements (Wan Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman, Morsali & Zaini 2018:8). For 
instance, an independent audit committee is able to provide independent oversight on 
the financial reporting process (Ghafran & Yasmin 2018:15; Wu et al. 2016:241), thus 
is likely to reduce misstatements in their financial statements (Soliman & Ragab, 
2014:1), financial statement fraud (Wan Mohammad et al. 2018:7), and financial 
restatement (Shafie & Zainal 2016:196). Hence, an independent audit committee is 
able to pick up any manipulations in the financial reports increasing the probability of 
an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
Audit committee remuneration   
The guidance, regulations and the literature highlight the remuneration factors which 
have the potential of compromising audit committee independence. For example, the 
amount, type and duration of the remuneration of audit committee members might 
influence the committee’s effectiveness (Maharaj 2015:3; Bierstaker, Cohen, Todd 
DeZoort & Hermanson 2012:131). According to Bierstaker et al. (2012:131), audit 
committee members may be remunerated by “cash, cash and short-term stock 
options, or cash and long-term stock options”. Studies found that audit committee 
members who are compensated through long-term stock options are more likely to 
support auditors rather than management when accounting disagreements arise. 
Conversely, audit committee members who are compensated through cash may 
enhance the objectivity of audit committee members’ oversight of financial reporting 
(Rickling & Sharma 2017:304).  
 
Since this study was performed in a public sector environment, the audit committee 
members were mostly remunerated through cash. To ensure the independence of the 
audit committee as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness, the King III recommends 
that the audit committee members should be remunerated fairly and their 
remuneration should be based on work performed (RSA 2011a: Section 94(11); 
IODSA 2009b:38-39). The remuneration of the audit committee should not depend on 
the company’s performance, but consisting of a base fee, as well as a fee paid for 
attendance of meetings (RSA 2011a: Section 94(11); IODSA 2009b:38-39). The 
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National Treasury Regulations requires that audit committee members from outside 
the public service should be remunerated based on a scale approved by the National 
Treasury or accounting officer in consultation with the executive authority (RSA 2005: 
Section 3.1.6 & 20.2.3). Audit committee terms of reference should define the terms 
(cost and time) and ensure that members are remunerated based on the tariffs as 
prescribed by members’ professional body or South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.6 & 20.2.3). The remuneration of all members of 
the audit committee should be disclosed in the notes of annual reports (RSA 2005: 
Section 20.2.4). 
 
Audit committee tenure 
The audit committee members’ tenure was also found to influence their independence. 
For instance, long-serving audit committee members may have close relations with 
management, which might result in the committee’s objectivity being compromised 
when reviewing management’s activities (Ghafran & Yasmin 2018:15). In addition, the 
audit fees were found to be higher when the audit committee members remained on 
the committee longer, as they required additional assurance (Sultana, Singh & 
Rahman 2019:12). To safeguard audit committee independence in the public sector, 
the internal audit framework states that an audit committee member’s contract should 
not be for a period exceeding six years, and there should also be a cooling-off period 
of two years (RSA 2009: Section 2.5.6). The King III, being more lenient, recommends 
that an audit committee members may not serve for more than nine years (IODSA 
2009b:38-39). 
 
Audit committee appointments 
The independence of the audit committee is also affected by the appointment process 
of members. The King III Code recommends that the board should ensure that 
companies have an effective and independent audit committee (IODSA 2009a: 
principle 3.1). In the South African private sector, the Companies Act requires the audit 
committee to be appointed by the incorporators of the company or the board of 
directors (RSA 2011a: Section 94(3a-b)). In the South African public sector, in the 
case of a shared audit committee, the audit committee is appointed by the National 
Treasury in consultation with the relevant executive authority (equivalent to the board 
of directors) (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.1). The accounting officer (equivalent to the Chief 
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Executive Officer (CEO)), in consultation with the executive authority in the case of 
the non-shared audit committee, may appoint the audit committee members (RSA 
2005:Section 3.1.2). According to Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011:398), 
the CEO’s involvement in the selection process reduces the audit committee’s 
effectiveness; CEOs are likely to appoint directors based on their interests and social 
ties (Carcello et al. 2011:399). This implies that the involvement of the accounting 
officers in the audit committee selection might reduce the independence of the audit 
committee. In the public sector, to safeguard the independence of audit committee 
members, the executive authority acts as a mediator in ensuring that appropriate audit 
committee members are appointed by the accounting officer (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.2 
and 3.1.3).  
 
Independent audit committee measures 
In addition, empirical studies that examined the independence of the audit committee 
have measured the independence of the audit committee as a percentage of audit 
committee size (Moses 2019:41; Mnif Sellami & Borgi Fendri 2017:612; Madi et al. 
2015:489). A high proportion of independent members on the audit committee are 
expected to enhance the quality of financial reporting (Moses 2019:37; Inaam & 
Khamoussi 2016:183; Salehi & Shirazi 2016:1646; Klein 2002:375). However, the 
study conducted by Kusnadi et al. (2016:202) found all the members of the audit 
committees studied were reported as independent. Similarly, an empirical study that 
was performed by Moloi (2015:81) in the South African national departments, also 
found that in most of the analysed annual reports (34 of 38), all audit committee 
members were independent. Thus, drawing from the above discussion, this study 
investigates disclosure on central government departments’ annual reports to 
determine whether audit committees consist of only independent non-executive 
members.  
 
This section provided an overview of the importance of having a fully independent 
audit committee as a corporate governance mechanism to ensure that the audit 
committee is effective in discharging their oversight of financial reporting quality and 
assurance processes. Thus, a fully independent audit committee are likely to obtain 
an unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy for higher financial reporting quality. 
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2.3.1.2  Financial expertise of audit committee members 
 
The literature on audit committee members with financial expertise as a proxy for audit 
committee effectiveness is provided in this section, followed by a discussion on the 
impact of the audit committee’s financial expertise on financial reporting quality.  
 
The existence of audit committee members with financial expertise was found to 
enhance the overall audit committee effectiveness (Bilal, Chen & Komal 2018; Kibiya 
et al. 2016:127; Kusnadi et al. 2016:209; Sultana 2015:90; Shbeilat 2014:543). An 
individual may acquire financial expertise through formal education or experience, and 
these individuals are likely to resolve, detect and prevent management from 
manipulating financial data and applying inappropriate accounting policies (Wang, Lee 
& Chuang 2016:2419; Kim, Segal, Segal & Zang 2014:2). Having an audit committee 
with financial expertise was found to reduce the risk of management fraud and improve 
financial reporting quality (Lee & Park 2019:129; Shafie & Zainal 2016:196). In 
addition, the audit committee members with financial expertise possess insights 
needed in considering the effect of complex and risky matters, for example, tax 
implications, cybersecurity and globalisation, on financial reporting (Bilal et al. 
2018:255; Hsu, Moore & Neubaum 2018:1293; KPMG 2017:12).  
 
There has been an ongoing debate in the literature on the definition of what constitutes 
accounting4 financial expertise (Bilal et al. 2018:254; Abernathy, Beyer, Masli & 
Stefaniak 2014:284; Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi 2010:789). In the absence of an 
acceptable definition of ‘accounting financial expertise’, most scholars have adopted 
the narrow definition of financial expertise, which is restricted to accounting financial 
expertise in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Badolato, Donelson & Ege 2014:208). More 
specifically, the studies have recommended that the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) should use the narrow definition of financial expertise, which only 
includes accounting. The studies that examined both the accounting and non-
accounting financial expertise were in favour of accounting financial expertise. For 
instance, financial experts in the audit committee with accounting expertise enhance 
the effectiveness of the audit committee (Bilal et al. 2018:253; Abernathy et al. 
                                            
4 This study emphasises accounting financial expertise. 
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2014:283; Hayes 2014:231; Dhaliwal et al. 2010:787). The quality of financial reporting 
was also found to be higher when there were accounting financial experts on audit 
committees, as they have the ability to observe that management produces higher 
quality financial reports (Kibiya et al. 2016:125; Kusnadi et al. 2016:197). Audit 
committee members with accounting financial expertise have inherent advanced 
levels of accounting and auditing knowledge (Bilal et al. 2018:262; Sultana, 2015:90; 
Sultana & Mitchell Van der Zahn 2015:280). Moreover, audit committee members with 
public accounting experience are positively associated with timelier financial reporting, 
as experienced individuals can review and analyse financial information more 
effectively and quicker (Abernathy et al. 2014:283). Accounting financial experts 
ensure that there is accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts (Abernathy, 
Herrmann, Kang & Krishnan 2013:1). Thus, the financial reporting quality is improved 
when the audit committee has an accounting and finance background, as the level of 
compliance to the accounting standards is increased (Bepari & Mollik 2015:196).  
 
In addition, the audit committee members with accounting and auditing expertise 
enhance the implementation of internal audit recommendations and improve internal 
controls (Lisic, Neal, Zhang, & Zhang 2016:1199; Alzeban 2015:539; Alzeban & 
Sawan 2015:61). The organisations with accounting financial expertise on their audit 
committees also benefit from lower audit fees, as accounting financial experts can 
review financial reports and recommend changes where necessary (Bilal et al. 
2018:253; Hayes 2014:233). Conversely, the non-accounting financial experts on the 
audit committee have insignificant influence on audit committee effectiveness (Bilal et 
al. 2018:253; Dhaliwal et al. 2010:787). Audit committees that lack accounting 
financial expertise require extensive external audit work in order to satisfy themselves 
that the financial reporting is of higher quality, resulting in higher audit fees (Ghafran 
& O’Sullivan 2013:578). Collectively, these studies were in favour of accounting 
financial expertise on the audit committee.  
 
A plethora of academic literature on audit committee financial expertise in general 
exists, without classifying financial expertise into accounting and non-accounting. For 
example, the financial experts in the audit committee are likely to report more 
conservatively (Sultana 2015:88), increase earnings quality (Kibiya et al. 2016:125), 
and improve compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), for 
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example, related to third party disclosures (Mnif Sellami & Borgi Fendri 2017:603). 
Furthermore, the financial experts in the audit committee will reduce the occurrence 
of earnings mismanagement and accounting errors (Zalata, Tauringanaa & Tingbanic 
2018:171; Badolato et al. 2014:208; He & Yang 2014:573; Sharma & Kuang 2014:76; 
Soliman & Ragab 2014:21; Inaam & Khamoussi 2016:179; Velte & Stiglbauer 
2011:17). Similarly, the financial experts in the audit committee reduce financial 
restatements (Wan et al. 2018:17) and mitigate the potential negative effect of non-
audit services on auditor reporting quality (Wu et al. 2016:240). However, these 
benefits of audit committee members with financial expertise indicate an expert review 
of accounting information, suggesting accounting financial expertise were applied. 
Thus, it appears these studies imply benefits of audit committee financial expertise are 
related to members’ accounting expertise.  
 
South African norms for audit committee accounting financial expertise  
The King III Code recommends that audit committee members should be suitably 
skilled and experienced (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.2). In the public sector, the PFMA, 
the National Treasury Regulations, and the MFMA require that audit committee 
members should have “appropriate experience” (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.4 and 27.1.4; 
RSA 2003: Section 166(4) (a); RSA 1999:77(a) (i)). In the private sector, the 
Companies Act states that the minister may prescribe minimum qualifications for the 
audit committee (RSA, 2011a: Section 94(5)). However, the literature suggests that 
the audit committee should consist of members with accounting financial expertise.  
 
The South African legislation and the corporate governance code of best practice do 
not specifically define audit committee expertise (Mnif Sellami & Borgi Fendri 
2017:616). However, organisations are expected to disclose audit committee 
members’ qualifications in their annual reports (RSA 2017:23; IODSA 2009b:42). 
Companies Act Regulations Part A (RSA 2011b: Section 42) prescribes that “at least 
one-third of the members of a company's audit committee at any particular time must 
have academic qualifications, or experience, in economics, law, corporate 
governance, finance, accounting, commerce, industry, public affairs or human 
resource management”.  
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To ensure that the audit committee is appropriately constituted with experienced 
members, the PSACF (2017:5) recommends that public sector audit committees 
should consist of members who have core skills, knowledge or experience in the 
overall financial reporting process. The PSACF (2017:6) further suggests that the 
relevant authority (for instance, the minister for national departments) should perform 
ongoing assessment and evaluation of the audit committee skills, knowledge and 
experience needed to improve effectiveness. Deloitte (2017:4) also suggests that the 
audit committee should perform annual self-reviews to identify areas that need to be 
improved and determine any skill shortage.  
 
The King codes and reports (King reports) do not emphasise or recommend audit 
committee members’ expertise and experience but refer to “suitably skilled and 
experienced” (IODSA 2009: Principle 3.2) or at most, “financial literacy” (IODSA 2016: 
Recommended practice note 55). King I (IODSA 1994) was silent about the audit 
committee’s expertise and experience. King II (IODSA 2002: Section 6.3.1) was the 
first report that required a majority of the audit committee members to have “relevant 
experience” and “financial literacy”; however, the report did not define the meaning of 
“relevant experience” and “financial literacy”. King III (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.2) 
recommended that “audit committee members should be suitably skilled and 
experienced independent non-executive directors”, but no reference was made to 
financial expertise. Lastly, the recent King IV recommends that “audit committee 
members should, as a whole, have the necessary financial literacy, skills and 
experience to execute their duties effectively” (IODSA 2016:56) without defining 
financial literacy, skills and experience.  
 
Clearly, the sentiment conveyed by King III (IODSA 2009b:57-56) aligns to the 
emphasis by United States of America (2002) on accounting financial expertise in the 
audit committee. This is evident by the fact that the audit committee is recommended 
to oversee integrated reporting and internal financial controls, as well as internal and 
external audit processes, among others, implying the application of accounting 
expertise and experience by audit committee members.  
 
At a generic level, King III (IODSA 2009b:57) recommends that the collective skills of 
the audit committee should reflect the size, circumstance and industry of the 
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organisation, enabling members’ probing questions on areas of responsibilities 
(IODSA 2009b:58). King III (IODSA 2009b:58) also recommends the audit committee 
should make use of consultants and specialists to assist in executing its duties (IODSA 
2009b:58).  
 
International researchers use accounting professional designations in the context of 
audit committee financial expertise. These authors have used different designations 
for the accounting financial expert; for instance, in the context of countries such as the 
United States of America, authors used the country’s designations of an accounting 
financial expert (Hsu et al. 2018:1306; Wilson 2015:305-306). For the purpose of this 
study, locally recognised accounting designations, namely Associate General 
Accountant of South Africa, Chartered Accountant South Africa (CA (SA)), Certified 
Internal Auditor, Chartered Global Management Accountant, Certified Financial 
Analyst, Professional Accountant South Africa, and Registered Government Auditor 
will be considered as accounting financial experts. 
 
Reflection on audit committee accounting financial expertise practices in the 
South African context 
Corporate research in South Africa revealed that the private sector employs 
accounting financial experts as audit committee members. For example, Deloitte 
(2018:4) analysed audit committee reports publicly available in mid-October 2017 of 
the top 50 JSE listed companies. Deloitte found that the majority (94%) of analysed 
companies had at least one audit committee member who was a CA (SA), while 91% 
of audit committee members held a degree in commerce (Deloitte 2018:04). Evidently, 
South African privately listed companies have adopted good governance practice, yet 
academic literature found that there are still some South African companies that do 
not have audit committee members with financial expertise (Mnif Sellami & Borgi 
Fendri 2017:616). 
 
Notwithstanding the benefits of having financial experts on audit committees, the 
South African public sector is generally struggling to recruit audit committee members 
with appropriate skills and experience (PSACF 2017:3). Providing a possible 
explanation for the struggle, Dintwe (2016:220) found that experienced and skilled 
individuals were not willing to serve as audit committee members of public sector 
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organisations due to prevalent mismanagement. At the root of mismanagement were 
capacity and skills gaps, weaknesses in the control environment, challenges with 
implementing accounting standards and constant changes in applicable standards, 
and difficulty in complying with an increasing number of legislative requirements 
(Dintwe 2016:220). In order to address the identified skill shortage, the PSACF 
implemented registration platforms for individuals interested in becoming audit 
committee members, as well as an advertisement platform for audit committee vacant 
posts (PSACF 2017:3). This initiative should assist the public sector in recruiting 
willing, skilled and knowledgeable individuals who have shown interest in becoming 
audit committee members.  
 
Number of accounting financial experts in an audit committee 
Studies that examined audit committees’ accounting financial expertise, suggested 
that each audit committee should make efforts to ensure that each audit committee 
has at least one financial expert (Bilal et al. 2018:253; Kusnadi et al. 2016:212; Cohen, 
Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2014:243; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:406). Other 
countries require audit committees to have at least two audit committee members with 
financial expertise (Kusnadi et al. 2016:200; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:406). 
Interestingly, Krishnamoorthy Wright and Cohen (2002:243) found that audit 
committees with accounting financial experts with industry expertise perform better 
than audit committees with only accounting financial expertise. Subsequent to the 
Enron debacle, researchers have questioned whether financial expertise makes any 
difference to audit committee effectiveness, as the majority of the Enron audit 
committee members were financial experts (Zalata et al. 2018:170; Shbeilat 
2014:543). However, most of the studies that have investigated audit committee 
financial expertise, measured financial expertise as a percentage of audit committee 
size (Abad & Bravo 2018:173; Hsu et al. 2018:1313; Tanyi & Smith 2015:66; Madi et 
al. 2015:489). This study employed the King III Code recommended practices in 
assessing disclosed audit committee effectiveness. Thus, the disclosure of at least 
one audit committee member with accounting financial expertise is taken to satisfy the 
King III Code recommendation that “the committee collectively should have sufficient 
qualifications and experience to fulfil its duties” (IODSA 2009a: Recommended 
practice 3.2.4).  
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This section provided an overview of the literature on the value of having audit 
committee members with accounting financial expertise as an important characteristic 
for audit committee effectiveness in enhancing financial reporting quality. Thus, 
organisations with an audit committee with at least one member with accounting 
financial expertise are likely to obtain an unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy 
for higher financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3.1.3  Number of audit committee meetings  
 
The literature on the number of audit committee meetings as a proxy for audit 
committee effectiveness is discussed in this section. The PFMA requires, and the King 
III Code recommends, that the audit committee should meet at least twice a year 
(IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.1.4; RSA 1999: Section 77(b)), while the 
MFMA requires that the audit committees should meet at least four times a year (RSA 
2003: Section166 (4) (b)). Nkonki (2015:14) proposed that the audit committee should 
meet at least three times per year. Frequent audit committee meetings with 
management, external auditors and internal auditors are likely to enhance the audit 
committee’s effectiveness of oversight of financial reporting quality. For instance, audit 
committees that meet often are likely to keep abreast with the affairs of the 
organisation and are able to identify issues and resolve them promptly (Gebrayel, 
Jarrar, Salloum & Lefebvre 2018:198; Salehi & Shirazi 2016:1648; Alzharani & Aljaaidi 
2015:42; Tao & Hutchinson 2013:86). Thus, audit committee meetings are an 
essential part of the oversight that reduce agency problems (Mustafa, Che-Ahmad & 
Chandren 2018:595; Wan Mohammad et al. 2018:8; Haji & Anifowose 2016:940; 
Sultana 2015:88).  
 
An audit committee that meets with other corporate governance mechanisms is likely 
to provide more effective oversight of the organisation (Zábojníková 2016). Audit 
committees are also required to meet with external auditors alone at least once a year 
to ensure that there are no unresolved issues (RSA 2005: Section 27.1.13 & 3.1.16). 
The legislation further requires the internal audit function to report to all audit 
committee meetings (RSA 2005: Section 27.2.8). Similarly, the prior literature found 
that a greater number of audit committee meetings are likely to enhance financial 
reporting quality and external audit quality, as the audit committee is likely to hire high-
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quality external auditors (DeZoort et al. 2002:65). The audit committee is expected to 
report to the board in case of the private sector companies, and the executive authority 
in the case of a central government departments on how they have discharged their 
duties (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.10). 
 
In addition, the chairman of the audit committee should be involved in setting and 
agreeing on an audit committee meeting agenda (IODSA 2009a: Recommended 
practice 3.3.2). The agenda should be provided to members in advance, together with 
the notice of the meeting. To ensure that the meetings are productive, the agenda 
should include a summary of each line item to be discussed and address the key 
points (Deloitte 2017:69). Thus, a well-constituted or planned audit committee meeting 
will be more effective than a committee meeting with no goals.  
 
The literature has used the number of audit committee meetings as a proxy for audit 
committee effectiveness (Wan Mohammad et al. 2018:8; Motubatse & Mashele 
2018:593; Haji & Anifowose 2016:940; Sultana 2015:88). The findings suggest that an 
audit committee that meets frequently enhances audit committee effectiveness in 
monitoring financial reporting quality. For instance, audit committees that meet 
frequently are likely to perform their duties effectively by providing monitoring oversight 
on management decisions relating to the selection of appropriate policies and 
accounting standards (Alzharani & Aljaaidi 2015:42; Sultana 2015:91). Similarly, an 
audit committee that meets more often is able to ensure that the financial reporting 
process is functioning properly, leading to increased financial reporting quality (Moses 
2019:40) and internal control quality (Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:397).  
 
However, other authors debated different interpretations of these findings. For 
instance, some argued that a high frequency of audit committee meetings might also 
suggest the presence of problems (Wan Mohammad et al. 2018:8). Conversely, audit 
committees that meet occasionally might be a sign that the audit committee only 
“rubber-stamps” management’s plans (Lisic et al. 2016:1209). When the minimum 
number of audit committee meetings is not prescribed, the audit committee should 
meet as often as necessary, taking into account the needs of the organisation. 
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Prior literature has suggested that the audit committee should consider adhering to 
the legislative requirement to avoid any non-compliance with laws and regulations. In 
addition, Nkonki (2015:14) suggested that the audit committee meetings should take 
place “prior to the commencement of the interim audit; after the interim audit and prior 
to the commencement of the year-end audit; and after completion of the year-end audit 
and prior to reporting”. Deloitte (2017:68) suggested that the audit committee should 
meet at least four times a year at appropriate times in the reporting and audit cycle. 
Similarly, an empirical study performed by Haji and Anifowose (2016:933) in South 
Africa, found that audit committee meetings range from two to 12 meetings per year, 
with an average of four meetings per year. Gebrayel et al. (2018:207) also found that 
most audit committees from Omani listed firms met at least 4.78 times a year. It can 
be concluded that given the public sector environment and its operational complexity 
and size, the audit committee should meet as often as it deems necessary, depending 
on the issues they are faced with. It is expected that audit committees that meet more 
frequently than the legislative requirement (twice a year) are likely to be more effective 
than audit committees that meet two or fewer times a year. In the absence of a 
recommended maximum number of audit committee meetings, audit committees that 
disclosed they met at least twice a year were considered by this study to have adhered 
to the recommendations of the King III Code (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 
3.1.4).  
 
This section provided an overview of the literature on the number of audit committee 
meetings, as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness in enhancing financial reporting 
quality. Thus, organisations with audit committee members that meet at least twice a 
year are more likely to obtain an unqualified opinion with no findings, as a proxy for 
higher financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3.1.4  Size of the audit committee 
 
The size of the audit committee is defined as the number of members in the audit 
committee. The audit committee should consist of a sufficient number of audit 
committee members to enable them to execute their duties as an agency mechanism. 
In South Africa, the Companies Act, the PFMA and the MFMA require, and the King 
III Code recommends, that the audit committee should consist of at least three 
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members (RSA 2011a: Section 94(2); IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.2.2; 
RSA 2005: Section 166(4) (a); RSA 1999: Section 77 (a)). The King III recommends 
that the audit committee should have a sufficient number of members to be able to 
fulfil its responsibilities effectively (IODSA 2009b: Principle 3.1(5)). Similarly, the 
United Kingdom corporate governance code suggests that the audit committee should 
have a minimum of three independent non-executive directors or two in case of small 
companies (FRC 2018:10; FRC 2014:C.3.1).  
 
Prior literature has examined the importance of the size of the audit committee as a 
proxy of audit committee effectiveness. The findings suggested that the audit 
committee size enhances the effectiveness of the committee and improves an 
organisation’s performance (Alzharani & Aljaaidi 2015:39). A larger audit committee 
was also found to increase stakeholder’s confidence in financial reporting quality and 
has the potential to increase audit committee members’ accountability (Wan 
Mohammad et al. 2018:9; Madi et al. 2015:488). Similarly, a larger audit committee is 
likely to discover issues quicker as each member might be responsible for a small 
section, allowing enough time to oversee management processes (Bédard & Gendron 
2010:194). In addition, a larger number of audit committee members might bring along 
diverse experience and expertise (Moses 2019:37; Lin & Hwang 2010:67), which is 
likely to improve its effectiveness. However, a smaller audit committee was found to 
work more efficiently than a larger audit committee; it is easier to manage a smaller 
group than a large group of people (Nkonki 2015:13).  
 
Given the size and complexity of the public sector, on average, the size of audit 
committees was found to be larger than the private sector audit committees 
(Rainsbury, Malthus & Capper 2012:103). In their analysis, Deloitte (2018:3) found 
that the audit committee in the private sector consists of four members on average. 
Deloitte (2017:4) also suggested that the audit committee size should be limited to 
four or five members. In the public sector, audit committees consisted of an average 
of six members, while the average for the local government was seven members 
(Rainsbury et al. 2012:109). Legislation and the King reports do not limit the number 
of audit committee members. In the absence of a recommended maximum number of 
audit committee members, audit committees that consisted of at least three members 
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were deemed as appropriately constituted and as having met the King III Code 
recommended practices for the purposes of this study.  
 
This section provided an overview of the literature on audit committee size as a proxy 
for audit committee effectiveness in enhancing financial reporting quality. Thus, 
organisations with at least three audit committee members are likely to obtain an 
unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy for higher financial reporting quality.  
 
2.3.1.5  Audit committee chair 
 
The South African public sector legislation requires that the audit committee chair 
should be independent, thus not employed by the department (RSA 2005: Section 
27.1.3 & 3.1.4; RSA 1999: Section 77(a) (iii)). Similarly, the King III Code recommends 
that the audit committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive director 
(IODS 2009a: Principle 3.3). As discussed in Section 2.3.1.1, using an agency 
perspective, the audit committee independence from management is essential for 
enhancing the interest and confidence of the stakeholders in the role played by the 
audit committee. The appointment of the chair of the audit committee is assigned to 
the board of directors (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.3.1). The King III 
Code also recommends that “the chairman of the board should not be the chair or 
member of the audit committee” (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.2.3 & 
3.3.1). Deloitte (2018:5) found that the majority of companies adhere to the 
recommendations of the King III Code. An independent audit committee chair reduces 
dilution of the independence and effectiveness of the audit committee (Li, Mangena & 
Pike 2012:108). Thus, an independent non-executive member should chair the audit 
committee.  
 
Researchers acknowledge that an independent audit committee chair is important for 
the effective functioning of the audit committee (Li, Mangena & Pike 2012:108). As a 
result, the effectiveness of the audit committee relies heavily on the leadership of the 
audit committee chair. According to Zaman and Sarens (2013:495), the knowledge 
and experience of the audit committee chair are associated with the effectiveness of 
the internal audit quality. Highlighting the important role of the audit committee chair, 
Ghafran and Yasmin (2018:13) referred to the audit committee chair as the “CEO” of 
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the audit committee and the “focal point for the committee’s relations with the board, 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), internal and external auditors”. Legislation requires the 
audit committee chair to be knowledgeable, having the requisite business, financial 
and leadership skills (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.4). An audit committee chair with 
knowledge about and experience with the organisation is able to encourage informal 
interactions between the audit committee and the internal audit function (Zaman & 
Sarens 2013:500). An audit committee chair should be able to facilitate a flow of 
information between the audit committee and management, as well as the internal and 
external auditors (Tanyi & Smith 2015:60). Thus, an audit committee chair with 
sufficient background in auditing and accounting is likely to be able to effectively 
interact with management, internal and external auditors.  
 
In addition, an audit committee chair with auditing and accounting background was 
considered by researchers to enhance financial reporting quality. The detailed 
literature on the impact of audit committee auditing and accounting background was 
provided in Section 2.4.2.2 of the study. Prior literature found that monitoring and 
experiential expertise of the audit committee chair ensure that organisations meet 
financial reporting timelines, resulting in more effective audit committees (Ghafran & 
Yasmin 2018:13). However, Tanyi and Smith (2015:61) found that when the chair of 
the audit committee has multiple directorships, their monitoring and oversight role on 
financial reporting weakens.  
 
The audit committee chair, being the driver of the audit committee, is expected to 
participate in setting and agreeing on the agenda of audit committee meetings (IODSA 
2009a: Recommended Practice 3.3.2). An audit committee chair with leadership skills 
is able to manage the meetings effectively and resolve disputes quickly (DeZoort et 
al. 2002:43). Thus, an audit committee chair with effective leadership skills will be able 
to prevent reliance on one member who has financial expertise (La Grange 2015:53). 
In addition, Shafie and Zainal (2016:195) found that an audit committee chair with 
accounting expertise or relevant work experience is likely to lead discussions and 
deliberate the results to reflect the understanding of the committee.  
 
The chair of the audit committee is recommended to attend annual general meetings 
of the organisation (IODSA 2009a: Recommended Practice 3.3.3). Thus, an 
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experienced audit committee chair is likely to be able to respond to all shareholders’ 
questions in relation to any audit committee roles and responsibilities.  
 
This section provided an overview of the literature on appointing an audit committee 
chair who is not the chair of the board, who is also an independent non-executive 
member with accounting financial expertise as a proxy for audit committee 
effectiveness in enhancing financial reporting quality. Thus, private and public sector 
organisations with an audit committee chair who is not the chair of the board of a 
company or the executive authority of a public sector organisation and has accounting 
financial expertise are likely to obtain an unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy 
for maintaining higher financial reporting quality. 
 
2.3.2  Audit committee oversight of financial reporting and assurance 
processes 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the audit committee’s oversight 
responsibilities of the financial reporting and assurance processes. King III refers to 
the finance function, internal auditors, external auditors and risk management as 
assurance providers (IODSA 2009b:62-66), requiring audit committee oversight 
thereof. For the audit committee to be effective, it should have an understanding of its 
roles and responsibilities and the knowledge and experience to meet its 
responsibilities (Qasim 2017:86). The audit committee should disclose in the annual 
report that it has an approved term of reference and that it has satisfied its 
responsibilities (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.10; RSA 2005: Section 27.1.7). To ensure 
the effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight of assurance providers, it is crucial 
for the audit committee to monitor the organisation’s relationship with its assurance 
providers (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.5.2). 
 
2.3.2.1  Financial reporting  
 
The audit committee’s oversight focuses on the effectiveness of the finance function 
and the financial reporting processes, considering the resources, expertise and 
experience needed (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.6). The audit committee should review 
the finance function annually (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.6.1) and 
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disclose the results of the review in the integrated report (IODSA 2009a: 
Recommended practice 3.6.2). The management is primarily responsible for preparing 
the financial statements and ensuring compliance with reporting standards. The 
accounting officer in a central government department is the manager responsible for 
the preparation of the financial statements and annual report (RSA 1999: Section 
40(b)). 
 
The financial statements are also referred to as financial reports; these are a medium 
of communicating the financial affairs of the organisation to the stakeholders (Moses 
2019:39). The information published in the financial statements should be in 
accordance with applicable generally recognised accounting practice (RSA 1999: 
Section 40(1)(b)). Any content in the financial report that is not accurate might mislead 
the stakeholders; since the stakeholders are not involved in the day-to-day 
management of the organisations, they use information in financial reports for 
decision-making. Drawing from the discussion, when management neglects their 
reporting responsibilities, this creates agency problems. 
 
To ensure that the financial reports are fair and accurate, the audit committee, as a 
sub-board committee, is tasked with monitoring the adequacy, reliability and accuracy 
of financial statements prepared by management (RSA 2005: Section 27.1.8(d)). The 
King III Code recommends the audit committee should oversee the integrated 
reporting (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.4). The financial statements alone have limited 
information, hence integrated reporting was introduced to report both financial and 
non-financial information (Haji 2015:757). However, the PFMA in South Africa does 
not require government departments to prepare integrated reports; instead, the 
government departments prepare financial statements with non-financial information 
in the annual report focussing on service delivery performance (RSA 1999: Section 
40(1)(a-b)). 
 
The audit committee should provide guidance to management when preparing 
financial reports in order to ensure that the reports are in compliance with relevant 
accounting standards (Lin & Hwang 2010:59). In South Africa, the PFMA requires the 
accounting officer to “prepare financial statements for each financial year in 
accordance with generally recognised accounting practice;" (RSA 1999: Section 
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40(1)(b)). Any non-compliance to the applicable standards reduces the quality of 
financial statements. The audit committee should also comment on its evaluation of 
the financial statements in the annual report (RSA 2005: Section 27.1.10 (c)), and 
ensure that the combined assurance model is applied (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.5). 
Drawing from the discussion, an effective internal governance structure provides 
effective monitoring of financial processes, thus reducing the risk of misstated financial 
statements. It is therefore, important that all assurance providers are effective in 
reducing agency costs and enhancing stakeholders’ confidence in published financial 
statements.  
 
The corporate governance mechanisms are used to ensure that financial reports 
comply with relevant accounting standards, including the reliability and credibility of 
financial statements (Inaam & Khamoussi 2016:180). According to Jonas and 
Blanchet (2000:354), financial reporting quality is not just the end product, but it 
includes the processes linked to the organisation’s transactions and events; selection 
of accounting policies; application of accounting policies; estimates and judgements 
involved; and disclosures of transactions, events, policies, estimates, and judgements. 
Thus, the quality of financial reporting relies on the financial reporting processes 
followed from the beginning to the end.  
 
The perceived quality of financial reporting also depends on the users’ needs. For 
instance, management and creditors tend to focus on valuation-related matters (Jonas 
& Blanchet 2000:354), while the general public tends to focus more on corporate 
governance disclosures as indicators of financial reporting quality and stewardship-
related issues (Jonas & Blanchet 2000:354). Another study defined financial reporting 
quality as financial reports that are complete, neutral and free from error, and provide 
a fair representation of the affairs of the organisation (Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer & Yohn 
2016:14). In addition, financial reports that obtained an unqualified opinion with no 
findings are also considered as having a higher financial reporting quality (Gaynor et 
al. 2016:14). Thus, government departments that obtain unqualified opinions without 
findings on their financial reports provide the general public with confidence that 
financial reporting standards were met and about the use of public funds in accordance 
with legislation, such as the PFMA.  
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This section provided brief literature on audit committees’ effective oversight of 
financial reporting as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness in enhancing the 
quality of financial reporting. Thus, organisations with audit committees that are 
effective in providing oversight of financial reporting are likely to obtain an unqualified 
opinion with no findings as a proxy for higher financial reporting quality. 
 
2.3.2.2  Internal audit function 
 
Audit committee’s oversight role of the internal audit function as an assurance process 
is discussed in this section. The internal audit function is referred to by many scholars 
as one of the corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the agency problem 
(Gebrayel et al. 2018:199). For instance, an effective internal audit function is essential 
for assessing the performance of the public sector and keeping management 
accountable (Coetzee & Erasmus 2017:236; Hendriks 2017:321). Hence, the internal 
audit function is considered a major source of information about the performance of 
management and the integrity of financial reporting processes used by audit 
committees (Gebrayel et al. 2018:18; Ege 2015:499).  
 
In the South African central government departments, the internal audit function 
should evaluate the information systems environment, reliability and integrity of 
financial information, safeguarding of assets, the effectiveness of operations, and 
compliance with laws, regulations and controls (RSA 2005: Section 3.2.11 (a-e)). The 
public sector’s internal auditors are also expected to assist the accounting officer to 
establish, communicate, monitor and achieve the objectives of state organisations 
(RSA 2005: Section 3.2.12).  
 
According to Ege (2015:499), the internal auditors are the “eyes and ears of the audit 
committee” in reducing management misconduct. Hence, internal auditors ensure 
accountability by providing assurance on the corporate values adhered to by 
management (RSA 2005: Section 3.2.12). A strong internal control system and 
effective internal audit were also found to have a positive effect on financial reporting 
quality (Kewo & Afiah 2017:568).  
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In the South African public sector, the legislation and regulations mandate all public 
entities to establish an internal audit function (RSA 2005: Section 27.2.2). Prior 
literature suggests that the standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors are influential 
outside the United States in providing guidance to internal auditors (Coetzee & 
Erasmus 2017:246). Moreover, public sector internal auditors are required to comply 
with the standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors (RSA 2005: Section 27.2.6). 
Previous studies did not find any significant difference between public and private 
sector internal audit effectiveness (Coetzee & Erasmus 2017:246; Erasmus & Coetzee 
2017:85).  
 
The internal audit function is expected to be independent of management, hence the 
regulations and the literature suggest that the internal audit function should report 
directly to the audit committee (Hoseini & Karimi-Pouya 2018:62; García, Barbadillo & 
Pérez 2012:310; RSA 2005: Section 27.2.8). The audit committee benefits more from 
interacting with the internal audit function in the absence of management, as the 
internal auditors are more open to discussing issues freely (Abdullah, Ismail & Smith 
2018:11; Zaman & Sarens 2013:512). Abbott, Parker and Peters (2010:13) found that 
internal auditors were reporting to the CFO or CEO instead of the audit committee. 
The King III Code recommends that the audit committee should be responsible for the 
appointment, dismissal and performance of the chief audit executive (IODSA 2009a: 
Recommended practice 3.7.1). Providing the audit committee with such 
responsibilities ensures the effectiveness of the internal audit function (Van der Nest, 
Thornhill & De Jager 2008:551). 
 
The audit committee should provide oversight of the internal audit function’s work to 
enhance the effectiveness of the internal audit function; for instance, the audit 
committee should approve the internal audit plan (IODSA 2009a: Recommended 
practice 3.7.2; RSA 2005: Section 3.2.7). The literature found that the audit 
committee’s review of the internal audit activities in various stages, particularly at the 
planning stage, enhances the effectiveness of the internal audit function (Abdullah et 
al. 2018:1). Moreover, the audit committee should ensure that the internal audit 
function is subject to an independent quality review when deemed necessary (IODSA 
2009a: Recommended practice 3.7.3).  
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A good working relationship between the audit committee and internal audit enhances 
internal control quality and therefore improves financial reporting quality (Khlif & 
Samaha 2016:269; García et al. 2012:310; Van der Nest et al. 2008:555). Active 
support from the audit committee to the internal audit function contributes to financial 
reporting quality as fraud and the likelihood of corporate failure is reduced (Abdullah 
et al. 2018:11) as a consequence of improved corporate governance (Chang, Chen, 
Cheng & Chi 2019:17; Ege 2015:497; García et al. 2012:327). For quality financial 
reporting, regulations require the public sector audit committee to ensure that any 
identified accounting and auditing concerns (RSA 2005: Section 3.10.1(e)) and risk 
areas are covered during the internal audit process (RSA 2005: Section 3.10.1 (c)).  
 
Material weaknesses in internal controls reduce the quality of financial reporting 
(Myllymäki 2014:93). To safeguard the internal controls, the regulation requires, and 
the King III Code recommends, the audit committee to review the effectiveness (RSA 
2005:3.1.10(a)) and activities of the internal audit function (IODSA 2009a: Principle 
3.7; RSA 2005: Section 3.1.10 (e & g)). For instance, an effective internal audit 
function is able to detect transaction manipulation in an institution (García et al. 
2012:328). An audit committee with greater oversight of the internal audit function thus 
increases the focus of the internal audit function on internal controls (Abbott et al. 
2010:22). The higher the quality of the internal audit function’s work, the more the 
external auditors can place reliance on internal controls (Mat Zain, Zaman & Mohamed 
2015:134). Organisations that want to reduce audit fees are thus likely to improve their 
financial reporting quality (Mat Zain et al. 2015:134).  
 
This section provided brief literature on audit committees’ effective oversight of the 
internal audit function as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness in enhancing the 
quality of financial reporting. Thus, organisations with audit committees that are 
effective in providing oversight of the internal audit function are likely to obtain an 
unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy for higher financial reporting quality. 
 
2.3.2.3  External audit function 
 
Agency theory suggests that external auditors play an important role in mitigating 
information asymmetry and agency problems between management and the 
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stakeholders, through expressing an opinion on the financial statements (Moalla & 
Baili 2019:106; Khlif & Samaha 2016:273). However, the roles of the audit committee 
and external auditors, in terms of financial reporting, are different. For instance, the 
primary objectives of the external auditors are to express an opinion on the fair 
presentation of the financial affairs in compliance with the applicable accounting 
standards and on the quality of the internal controls over financial reporting (Moalla & 
Baili 2019:104). In the South African public sector, the AGSA is mandated to audit the 
financial statements of the central government departments (RSA 2018: Section 4(b)). 
The opinion expressed by the external auditors provides the stakeholders with 
confidence in the credibility and integrity of the financial statements, but not absolute 
assurance. The different types of audit opinions that can be issued by the external 
auditors are discussed in Section 1.1 of this study.  
 
The independence of the external auditors depends on the body which is responsible 
for nominating, dismissing and deciding on their remuneration (Shbeilat 2014:543). To 
safeguard the independence of external auditors from management, audit committees 
are expected to assist the board in nominating external auditors for appointments 
(IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.9). However, in the South African public sector, the AGSA 
is the only external auditors appointed by parliament to audit the central government 
departments (RSA 1999: Section 8(2)).  
 
The South African legislation requires, and the corporate governance code 
recommends, audit committees should monitor and report on the independence of the 
external auditors (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.9.3; RSA 2005: Section 
27.1.8). The audit committee is also responsible for approving the terms of 
engagement and remuneration of the external auditors (IODSA 2009a: 
Recommended practice 3.9.2). The King III Code further recommends the audit 
committee to approve non-audit services provided by the external auditors (IODSA 
2009a: Recommended practice 3.9.4), however, the AGSA does not provide any 
services to the public sector other than an external audit.  
 
To promote the South African public sector audit committee’s oversight of the external 
auditors, the audit committee is required to meet with the external auditors at least 
annually (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.16). The meetings should include discussions on the 
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external audit process as recommended by King III Code, for the audit committee to 
review the quality and effectiveness of the audit process (IODSA 2009a: 
Recommended practice 3.9.6). Furthermore, the audit committee is expected to 
review risk areas to be covered during the external audit (RSA 2005: Section 
3.1.10(c)), and the external auditors should inform the audit committee of any identified 
reportable irregularities (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.9.5). In the South 
African public sector, the external auditors should also report any accounting and 
auditing concerns identified during the audit to the audit committee (RSA 2005: 
Section 3.1.10(e)).  
 
Audit committee interactions with external auditors were found to enhance the audit 
quality as a proxy for an audit opinion (Beattie, Fearnley & Hines 2013:56). Some of 
the characteristics of an effective audit committee were also found to enhance the 
audit committee’s relationship with external auditors. The audit committee’s 
independent non-executive directors with financial expertise are able to act as 
mediators in resolving accounting issues between management and external auditors 
(Appiah & Amon 2017:300; Wu et al. 2016:241). Furthermore, the audit committee’s 
experience enhances the quality of corporate governance which might lead to higher 
audit quality and reduced audit fees (Sultana et al. 2019:3). The quality of corporate 
governance was found to be a good predictor of the type of audit opinion an 
organisation can obtain (Sun 2019:546).  
 
This section provided brief literature on audit committees’ effective oversight over the 
external audit function as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness in enhancing the 
quality of financial reporting. Thus, organisations with audit committees that are 
effective in providing oversight of external audit functions are likely to obtain an 
unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy for higher financial reporting quality. 
 
2.3.2.4  Risk management  
 
Risk management is essential for the organisation’s good governance and needs to 
be effective to ensure the sustainability of the organisation (Abdullah, Shukor & 
Rahmat 2017:83). Stakeholders are increasingly concerned about the status of 
organisations’ practices in relation to risk management (Abdullah et al. 2017:83). It is 
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also important that risk management information is disclosed to reduce information 
asymmetry between management and stakeholders (Tao & Hutchinson 2013:86). 
Thus, risk management is regarded as a corporate governance mechanism in 
ensuring sustainable stakeholders’ value (Van Vuuren 2016:165).  
 
The importance of risk management and the expected disclosure is evident in the 
recommendations provided in King III and the King III Code (IODSA 2009) and by the 
regulatory authorities. The audit committee is expected to disclose in the annual report 
that they have carried out their responsibilities in relation to the risk management set 
out in their charter (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.8.1). To ensure effective 
monitoring of the risk management process, the audit committee should be involved 
in the organisation’s risk assessment (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.8). Prior studies 
suggested that audit committee effectiveness enhances the quality of internal control 
and increases risk management effectiveness (Ghafran & Yasmin 2018:15; Alzharani 
& Aljaaidi 2015:39). Similarly, the number of audit committee meetings and members 
(Musallam 2018:4125), as well as members’ expertise (Maharaj 2015:16), are also 
significantly associated with effective oversight of risk management. Thus, audit 
committee effectiveness plays an important role in ensuring that management, as well 
as the internal and external auditors are effective in their roles related to risk 
management. For instance, the internal auditors play an important role in assisting the 
audit committee with examining, evaluating and reporting on the overall risk 
management process (Hameed, Hashmi, Ali & Arif 2017:36). Similarly, the external 
auditors, as part of their audit process, assess the organisation’s risk management 
processes and implementations (Hameed et al. 2017:36). From this discussion, it can 
be expected that the audit committee’s effective monitoring of both the internal and 
external audit processes contributes to overall risk management.  
 
A prior study confirmed a link between risk management and financial reporting quality 
(Cohen et al. 2017:1204). This link purports that the higher the quality of the risk 
management process, the higher the quality of financial reporting (Cohen et al. 
2017:1204). In order for the audit committee to improve the quality of financial 
reporting, the audit committee is recommended to oversee the financial reporting, 
internal financial controls, fraud risks and information technology risks in relation to 
financial reporting (IODSA 2009a: Recommended practice 3.8.2.1 - 3.8.2.4).  
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This section provided brief literature on the value of audit committee effectiveness 
oversight of risk management as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness in 
enhancing the quality of financial reporting. Thus, organisations with audit committees 
that are effective in providing oversight of risk management are likely to obtain an 
unqualified opinion with no findings as a proxy for higher financial reporting quality. 
 
2.4  AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS DISCLOSURE 
 
This study employed the agency theory as the theoretical framework in addressing the 
objectives of this study. As discussed in Section 2.2, information asymmetry arises 
from the separation of power between stakeholders and management (Haldar & 
Raithatha 2017:252; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey & Stapleton 2012:176). Thus, it is 
essential that the audit committee, as agency mechanism, reduces information 
asymmetry (Akhtaruddin 2010:70). The audit committee is entrusted with ensuring that 
the stakeholders have access to the information that relates to the affairs of the 
organisation, which, among others, include audit committee roles and responsibilities, 
thus reducing the information asymmetry (Akhtaruddin 2010:72). From the discussion, 
it can be concluded that information disclosure is essential as stakeholders assess the 
performance and effectiveness of board committees based on what is disclosed in the 
annual reports. Sufficient disclosure about the audit committee in the annual reports 
will thus enable the stakeholders to evaluate the degree of impact the audit committee 
has on the organisation’s financial reporting and assurance processes, including the 
audit opinion. The disclosed audit committee oversight of financial reporting and 
assurance processes provide confidence to the stakeholders that the committee is 
doing what it is expected to do. 
 
Management may elect to disclose their compliance to the King reports in the 
integrated report, sustainability report, social and ethics committee report with other 
online or printed information or reports as long as they are publicly available (IODSA 
2016:38). However, for the South African central government departments, the annual 
reports are used to report both financial and non-financial information. This disclosure 
of compliance is essential as it provides the stakeholders information about with the 
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status of corporate governance of an organisation. In the public sector, the National 
Treasury Regulations require that central government departments disclose 
information regarding the audit committee’s oversight of financial reporting and 
assurance processes in their annual reports (RSA 2005: Section 3.1.9). The National 
Treasury Regulations also stipulate the type of information to be disclosed in the 
annual reports in relation to audit committees; non-disclosure of such information will 
thus constitute non-compliance to laws and regulations. Non-disclosure of 
recommended principles and practices in the King III Code would imply that the 
recommended principles and practices were not applied. However, voluntary 
disclosure by the central government departments of the King III Code 
recommendations might reduce information asymmetry and enhance the 
stakeholders’ confidence in audit committee oversight of financial reporting and 
assurance processes. Audit committee characteristics, such as independence and 
size, were found to enhance corporate voluntary disclosure (Madi et al. 2015:486).  
 
Earlier studies in South Africa, investigated the effectiveness of audit committees’ 
disclosure to stakeholders. For example, Moloi (2015:67), Marx and Voogt (2010:17) 
and Marx (2009:31) found that there is insufficient disclosure, as audit committees’ 
oversight of financial reporting and assurance processes exceeded what was being 
disclosed. In a more recent study, Coetzee and Erasmus (2019:1) found that the public 
sector organisations have improved their voluntary disclosure of audit committee 
oversight of financial reporting and assurance processes in relation to King III Code 
recommended principles and practices.  
 
2.5  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter 2 provided literature on the agency theory as a theoretical framework 
employed in this study, as an audit committee is considered an agency control 
mechanism to reduce agency problems. Through a review of the legislation, the King 
reports and codes, and the literature, the audit committee effectiveness variables in 
relation to financial reporting quality and the resultant external audit opinion were 
explored.  
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Audit committee independence, accounting financial expertise, number of meetings, 
size and the chair of the audit committee, as audit committee effectiveness variables, 
were discussed. Then, audit committee oversight of financial reporting, the internal 
audit function, the external audit function and risk management, were presented as 
audit committee effectiveness variables. 
 
In the next chapter, the research process followed in this study is provided. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 2 contextualised audit committee effectiveness variables and the influence 
thereof on financial reporting and assurance processes, using agency theory as a 
frame. Audit committee characteristics and oversight of financial reporting and 
assurance processes were discussed as proxies of audit committee effectiveness.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the literature and discuss the research 
process followed in this study, as outlined by various authors (Creswell & Creswell 
2018:70; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009:xix; Kothari 2004:11). Figure 3.1 depicts 
the steps of the research process that were applied in this study. The discussion on 
ethical considerations is also included in the chapter.  
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Figure 3.1: Research process 
Source: Creswell & Creswell 2018:70; Saunders et al 2009:xix; Kothari 2004:11 
 
These research steps are individually discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
 
 
FORMULATING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
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3.2  FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
A research problem refers to an area of concern identified by a researcher in the 
context of either a theoretical or practical situation, whereby the researcher is 
undertaking a scientific study that aims to obtain a solution (Kothari 2004:24). A good 
research problem is when the individual or institution does not know the cause of the 
problem and is in doubt about the solution (Kothari 2004:25). Thus, a research 
problem is a clear statement of an existing condition that requires the researcher to 
obtain the best possible solution (Kothari 2004:25). When formulating a research 
problem, the researcher should ensure that studying the problem will have significant 
benefits for the participants and other stakeholders (Creswell & Creswell 2018:92). 
Thus, from observation of annual reports of the public sector, the research problem of 
this study is the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables 
and the external audit opinion expressed in South African central government 
departments is unclear  
 
3.3  FORMULATING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
A research objective can be referred to as a statement that identifies what the 
researcher aims to achieve as the outcome of the undertaken research (Saunders et 
al. 2009:600). Research objectives (Section 1.4) provide direction for the study as they 
summarise the aim of the research.  
 
3.4  RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
 
Research philosophy refers to the way in which one views the world. These views are 
based on assumptions and direct the research design and methods (Saunders et al. 
2009:108). “Individuals develop their view of the world based on their discipline 
orientation and research communities, advisors and mentors and past research 
experiences” (Creswell & Creswell 2018:5). Individuals have different ways of viewing 
the world around them, which are also based on their beliefs (Creswell 2014:35).  
This study adopted a positivist philosophy. Positivism is an approach used to 
investigate social phenomena and explain the social world (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché 
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& Delport 2011:6). Positivist researchers study problems by identifying and assessing 
the effect of an outcome (Creswell 2014:5). The assumptions concerned with 
positivism hold more true for quantitative research than for qualitative research 
(Creswell & Creswell 2018:6). Positivism believes that the research undertaken can 
be repeated and similar results will be achieved (Rehman & Alharthi 2011:53; 
Saunders et al. 2009:114). According to De Vos et al. (2011:6), “positivism entails a 
belief that only those phenomena that are observable, in the sense of being amenable 
to the senses, can validly be warranted as knowledge”.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the positivist approach was followed using an agency 
perspective in addressing the research objectives. During further data analysis, 
hypotheses were developed to test the relation between the disclosed audit committee 
effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed, therefore 
investigating a social phenomenon as postulated by positivism. The audit committee 
effectiveness variables were observed through the content analysis of the disclosures 
of the audit committee characteristics and oversight of financial reporting and 
assurance processes in the annual reports.  
 
There are different principles concerned with research philosophy, namely ontology 
(i.e. nature of reality), epistemology (how we know what we know), axiology and 
methodology (the process of research) (Rehman & Alharthi 2011:51; McGregor & 
Murnane 2010:421). The remainder of this chapter will focus on the research process 
followed to address the research objectives; the researcher, as discussed above, 
takes the position of the positivist (epistemology). The research method employed in 
this study is discussed in Section 3.6 (methodology). 
 
3.5  DETERMINING THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
According to De Vos et al. (2011:143), the research design focuses on the end product 
and the steps followed in achieving the objectives of the study. There are two 
developmental research designs, namely a cross-sectional study or longitudinal study. 
In cross-sectional studies, different groups of populations are used, while in 
longitudinal studies, a single group population is studied over a period of time (Leedy 
& Ormrod 2015:157). Longitudinal studies are also correlation studies (Leedy & 
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Ormrod 2015:158). This study adopted a cross-sectional approach as data from the 
various government departments were considered at the same point in time. This 
study also employed a quasi-experimental design allowing the researcher to draw 
conclusions about the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and the external audit opinion expressed (De Vos et al. 2011:149). A quasi-
experimental design is used when researchers aim to determine if the independent 
variables have an effect on the outcome of a dependent variable (De Vos et al. 
2011:145). Similarly, this study aimed to test the impact of disclosed audit committee 
effectiveness variables (independent variable) on the external audit opinion expressed 
(dependent variable).  
 
In order to achieve the aim and primary objective of the study, the research design 
included a discussion on the research methods employed, the population from which 
the sample was selected, the method of processing and analysing the data, the quality 
considerations and method of interpreting the analysed data, and presenting the 
results. Sections 3.6 to 3.11 present the different steps followed in the research 
design.  
 
3.6  RESEARCH METHODS  
 
There are different types of research approaches, including quantitative, qualitative or 
mixed-method research. Each approach has its own purpose, methods of inquiry, 
strategies of collecting and analysing the data, and the quality of the criteria (De Vos 
et al. 2011:63). The quantitative approach uses numerical data, the qualitative 
approach uses non-numerical data, and the mixed-methods approach uses both 
numerical and non-numerical data.  
 
The aim of the quantitative approach is to explain, predict and control phenomena 
(Creswell 2014:83; De Vos et al. 2011:63). Studies that follow the quantitative 
approach tend to be specific in their research questions or develop hypotheses about 
variables that can be observable or measurable (De Vos et al. 2011:64). The 
quantitative approach tends to confirm or modify existing theories or practices (Leedy 
& Ormrod 2015:98). Only a few variables in quantitative studies are identified and data 
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are specifically collected for those identified variables (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:99). The 
unit of measurement method of each variable is identified, developed and 
standardised, with consideration given to the validity and reliability of the instruments 
used in measuring the variables (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:99). The sample for 
quantitative studies is usually drawn from large samples representing a certain 
population, so generalisation might be made of that population (Leedy & Ormrod 
2015:99). The results of the quantitative approach are arrived at using statistical 
methods or other quantitative procedures (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:100). 
 
The qualitative approach is the method used to explore and understand the meaning 
that individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell & Creswell 
2018:4). The qualitative approach is generally used in research where the researcher 
seeks to answer questions about complex situations (De Vos et al. 2011:64). The 
samples for qualitative studies are usually smaller, and the results are not generalised 
to the entire population (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:99). 
 
The mixed-method approach uses both the quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
responding to research objectives (Creswell & Creswell 2018:4; Leedy & Ormrod 
2015:100; Saunders et al. 2009:152). This approach provides more insights than when 
quantitative and qualitative approaches are used separately. For the purpose of this 
study, the quantitative approach was used as the researcher sought to quantitatively 
test the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the 
external audit opinion expressed.  
 
In order to determine the disclosure or non-disclosure of the audit committee 
effectiveness variables in the annual reports, content analysis was used as an 
empirical methodology. Research methods refer to techniques and procedures used 
to collect, analyse and interpret data (Saunders et al. 2009:3). Content analysis is 
defined as a systematic technique used to evaluate or examine the content of a 
particular body of material (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:102). Similarly, Mouton (2013:165) 
defined content analysis as an analysis of the content of text or documents which 
include letters, speeches and annual reports. Definitions provided by Leedy and 
Ormrod (2015:275) and Mouton (2013:165) took a broader view of content analysis. 
According to Mouton (2013:165) ‘content’ refers to words, meanings, pictures, 
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symbols, themes or any message that can be communicated. Content analysis is 
predominantly used in studies that focus on forms of human communication, and 
includes, but is not limited to, legal documents, newspapers, personal journals, music, 
art and films (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:275).  
 
Neuendorf (2011:277) defined content analysis as “a summarising, quantitative 
analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method, including attention to 
objectivity/intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalisability, 
replicability, and hypothesis testing”. Cameron and Mclaverty (2008:78) described 
content analysis “as the quantitative component of document analysis, involving 
compartmentalising the written material into researcher-selected units or categories”. 
Moreover, according to Neuendorf (2011:277), content analysis is not limited to the 
type of message to be analysed or the type of variables that might be measured.  
 
Quantitative content analysis is deductive and aims to test hypotheses or address 
objectives generated from theories or previous empirical studies (Zhang & Wildemuth 
2009:318). Qualitative content analysis is inductive and moves from the specific to the 
general (Elo & Kyngäs 2008:109). It may be used in conjunction with other methods 
of data analysis (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:275). Researchers who employ content 
analysis use a structured method to quantify the content of the qualitative text in a 
simple, clear format (Cameron & Mclaverty 2008:78). Through content analysis, the 
researcher is able to distil words into fewer content-related categories (Elo & Kyngäs 
2008:108).  
 
However, there are limitations to content analysis. According to Mouton (2013:166), it 
involves discursive practices which are context-dependent or context-bound and 
limited in their generalisability. The use of words as a unit of measurement in content 
analysis is difficult as different people might have different interpretations of different 
words, thereby taking them out of context (Moloi 2008:85). There are also no clear 
guidelines for using content analysis (Elo & Kyngäs 2008:113). However, Weber 
(1990:37) states that the use of word categories inferred from variations among high-
frequency words are more reliable than themes.  
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Content analysis can be used to break down information of a descriptive or 
experimental study. Studies that follow content analysis tend to collect data by 
identifying or selecting a sample of specific material to be analysed (Leedy & Ormrod 
2015:276). For instance, the content analysis might involve counting frequencies to 
observe various characteristics in the body of the material (Leedy & Ormrod 
2015:276). Descriptive or inferential statistical analyses can also be used depending 
on the research question (Leedy & Ormrod 2015:276). The primary objective of this 
study was to determine the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and the external audit opinion expressed in the South African central 
government departments. The quantitative approach was thus employed to address 
the primary and secondary objectives of this study. Appendix A offers the list of audit 
committee effectiveness variables included in the King Code and an interpretation of 
variables, where necessary. The keywords used when performing the content analysis 
of central government departments’ annual reports are also mentioned in Appendix A. 
The statistical tests are discussed in Section 3.9.2. 
 
3.7  SAMPLING  
 
This section provides a discussion of the population and the selected sample. The 
population of the study, among others, refers to organisations or institutions in which 
the researcher is interested (De Vos et al. 2011:223). The method used to select a 
sample and the population from whom the sample was selected should be carefully 
chosen (Etikan, Musa & Alkassim 2016:2). The total population is described as the 
total units/participants from whom the researcher intends to select the sample. 
Sampling refers to the method used to select a small number of organisations or 
institutions of a population who share similarities in their characteristics (De Vos et al. 
2011:223). A sample is selected when testing the total population is not feasible (De 
Vos et al. 2011:224), and the total population is used when it is relatively small (Etikan 
et al. 2016:3). 
 
3.7.1 Total population  
 
The South African central government departments (national and provincial 
departments) was the population of interest for this study. All central government 
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departments are mandated to adhere to the South African legislation and regulations 
relevant to the public sector (AGSA 2015a:34). The total population consisted of 38 
national departments and 125 provincial departments, as reported in the 2014/15 
financial year period. Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the total population (AGSA 
2015e:329-358) and the different audit outcomes achieved by the various central 
government departments. The time period was selected because at the time data were 
collected in 2016, the annual reports for the 2014/15 period were the most recent 
available in the public domain. As a result, audit committee effectiveness variables 
from the King III Code was used as it was applicable to the financial year 2014/15. 
King IV was effective from 1 April 2017, being the period after which this study was 
already in progress. 
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Table 3.1:  Total population and types of external audit opinion  
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National departments 
National 
department 
38 11 22 4 0 0 1 
Provincial departments 
Western 
Cape 
14 12 1 0 0 0 1 
Gauteng 16 8 7 1 0 0 0 
Free State 13 5 6 2 0 0 0 
Mpumalanga 13 3 7 3 0 0 0 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
16 2 9 5 0 0 0 
Eastern 
Cape 
14 2 9 3 0 0 0 
Northern 
Cape 
13 2 6 5 0 0 0 
Limpopo 13 1 9 2 0 1 0 
North West 12 1 9 2 0 0 0 
Total 
population 
162 47 85 27 0 1 2 
Source: AGSA 2015e:329-358 
 
3.7.2 Sample selection 
 
The technique used in selecting a sample depends on the type of population and the 
objective of the study. Probability and non-probability sampling techniques are two 
techniques used for sample selection in quantitative studies. For instance, in 
probability sampling, the total population has “distinguishing characteristics which are 
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used for ensuring that each unit in the population has a known, non-zero chance of 
being included in the sample” (Etikan et al. 2016:1). Probability sampling means that 
all the participants in the population have an equal chance of being selected. On the 
other hand, a non-probability sample means each unit does not have an equal chance 
of being selected (Etikan et al. 2016:1). Non-probability sampling is generally 
employed when the researcher wants to draw the sample from a population of interest 
(Etikan et al. 2016:1).  
 
All 38 national departments were selected, as the total population at national level was 
considered small. This method of sampling, where the total population is selected, is 
referred to as total population sampling (Etikan et al. 2016:3).  
 
For the nine provinces, purposive sampling was used to select four of the nine 
provinces in South Africa. The purposive sampling method is used for both qualitative 
and quantitative studies (Tongco 2007:147), yet according to Etikan et al. (2016:4), 
purposive sampling is typically used in a qualitative study. However, this does not 
mean that the purposive sampling method cannot be used in quantitative studies. The 
sampling method depends on the objective of the study (Etikan et al. 2016:4).  
 
The purposive sampling method is used when the researcher has an understanding 
of the characteristics of the total population (De Vos et al. 2011:1166). Purposive 
sampling can also be referred to as judgement sampling since a unit is selected 
deliberately based on its characteristics (Etikan et al. 2016:2; Tongco 2007:147). 
Purposive sampling allows the researcher to select a sample that will enable the study 
to respond to the research objectives (Saunders et al. 2009:237). According to De Vos 
et al. (2011:232), sampled units should each have most of the characteristics present 
in the entire population. For the purposes of this study, the four provinces were 
selected based on their external audit opinions. The two provinces with the highest 
number of unqualified opinions with no findings and the two provinces with the least 
number of unqualified opinions with no findings were chosen. Selecting these 
provinces provided an understanding of the best and worst practices in the entire 
population of nine provinces. According to Etikan et al. (2016:3), this form of sampling 
is called ‘extreme/deviant case’ sampling, which is used when the study seeks to 
develop a ‘best practice’. The results of purposive sampling may not be generalisable 
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as each unit has a unique value to the study (Etikan et al. 2016:4), only valid for the 
specific population (Tongco 2007:154). 
 
3.7.3 Sample size 
 
The size of the sample depends on the objective of the study (Saunders et al. 
2009:219), and the total population; the smaller the total population, the larger the 
sample should be in relation to the total population, and vice versa (De Vos et al. 
2011:224). The sample size also has an impact on the possible statistical tests (De 
Vos et al. 2011:224), and since this study used statistical tests to analyse the data, it 
was essential that an appropriate sample size was used.  
 
The four selected provinces consisted of 555 provincial departments, which 
represented 44.5% (55/124) of the total provincial departments in all nine provinces, 
as indicated in Table 3.1. In aggregate, the sample included 93 departments, 
representing 57.4% (93/162) of the total population of central government 
departments. This sample size is supported by De Vos et al. (2011:224-225), who 
state that a sample size of 32% to 45% is statistically sufficient for a population 
between 100 and 200 units. Thus, this study’s sample of 57.4% of central government 
departments is deemed sufficient for making statistically significant deductions about 
the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the 
external audit opinion expressed. 
 
It is evident from Table 3.1 that Gauteng (eight out of 16 departments) and the Western 
Cape (12 out of 14 departments) had the highest number of departments with 
unqualified opinions with no findings. Furthermore, it is clear that Limpopo (one out of 
13 departments) and the North West (one out of 12 departments) had the least number 
of departments with unqualified opinions with no findings (AGSA 2015e:329-358). As 
stated, these four sampled provinces represent 55 of the 124 provincial departments. 
  
                                            
5 In 2014/15 the North West province had 13 departments. The researcher omitted the department of 
Economic and Enterprise development from this study by mistake. This department obtained an 
unqualified opinion with findings, as that one of the 10 other departments. The omission of this 
department did not materially affect the results of this study.  
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3.8  SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION AND CAPTURING 
 
3.8.1 Secondary data collection and capturing  
 
This section provides a discussion on the type of data that were collected and the 
process followed. There are two types of data, namely primary (comes from the 
original source) and secondary data (material that comes from someone else). This 
study used secondary data which were collected from the annual reports of the 
sampled departments.  
 
3.8.2 Data capturing process 
 
Annual reports for the financial year 2014/15 were downloaded from the sampled 
central government departments’ websites. Non-financial information related to the 
audit committees were collected from the annual reports. The external audit opinions 
were obtained from the auditor’s report in each annual report. The external audit 
opinions were cross-checked with the consolidated report of audit outcomes prepared 
and published on the AGSA website.  
 
King III Code recommended practices were used for audit committee effectiveness 
variables. From the King III Code, 49 audit committee effectiveness variables (refer to 
Appendix A) were identified and recorded on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
 
All the annual reports for the South African central government departments are 
expected to have a section on audit committees, indicated as “Report of the Audit 
Committee” or “Audit committee report” as required by the National Treasury  (RSA 
2017:34) . The audit committee effectiveness variables were located during a search 
of the entire annual report of each of the sampled departments. The audit committee 
report within each annual report was scrutinised and examined for audit committee 
effectiveness variables. The “control find” function was used to search for the 
keywords indicated in Appendix A. When an audit committee effectiveness variable 
was disclosed in the annual report, it was coded as “1” on the spreadsheet. When the 
annual report did not disclose an audit committee effectiveness variable, it was coded 
as “-1” on the spreadsheet. The disclosures and non-disclosures recorded on the 
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spreadsheet were cross-checked by researcher’s colleague. Exceptions were made 
when capturing the audit committee size and number of meetings, as discussed in 
Section 3.9.1.2. Only when the department met minimum requirements as 
recommended by the King III Code was it coded as “1”, otherwise it was coded as  
“-1”. 
 
3.9 PROCESSING AND ANALYSING THE DATA 
 
In this section, the data processing and analysis is presented in two sub-sections, 
namely variable definitions and measurements, and data analysis and procedures.  
 
3.9.1  Variable definitions and measurements  
 
This study analysed the disclosure of variables associated with audit committee 
effectiveness. According to Creswell (2014:84), variables “refers to a characteristic or 
attribute of an individual or an organisation that can be measured or observed and that 
varies among the people or organisation being studied”. The impact of audit committee 
effectiveness variables was measured against the external audit opinion expressed 
as a proxy for financial reporting quality. Audit committee characteristics and oversight 
of financial reporting and assurance processes were used as audit committee 
effectiveness variables. Different types of external audit opinions were used to 
distinguish financial reporting quality. In this section, the definition and measurement 
of dependent and individual independent variables are explained. The literature in 
support of variables was discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
3.9.1.1  Dependent variable  
 
Dependent variables are variables that depend on independent variables and cannot 
exist on their own (Creswell 2014:84). In order to empirically determine the effect of 
the disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables in the central government 
departments, the different types of external audit opinions, as proxies for financial 
reporting quality, were used as dependent variables. Section 1.1 provided the 
background and definitions of the different types of audit opinions. The term ‘Audit 
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outstanding’, was also included under external audit opinions, but is not regarded as 
an audit opinion; rather, it indicates that the audit was not completed, as the 
management of the department failed to submit the financial statements to the AGSA 
for audit by the date prescribed by the PFMA. The PFMA requires the South African 
public sector to “submit those financial statements within two months after the end of 
the financial year to the AGSA” (RSA 1999: Section 40 (1)(c)(i)). 
 
In Table 3.2, the different types of external audit opinions and the value assigned to 
each based on their order of significance as proxies of financial reporting quality, are 
presented in this study.  
 
Table 3.2: Ranked values of external audit opinions 
 
Source: Author 
 
The ranked values in Table 3.2 indicate that an audit opinion associated with the 
highest financial reporting quality is given the highest-ranked value. As the quality of 
financial reporting progressively declines, lower-ranked values are assigned to the 
associated audit opinion. A detailed explanation of audit opinions and their meanings 
were provided in Section 1.1. This kind of ranking is referred to as ‘ordinal ranking’ (De 
Vos et al. 2011:250). This study determined the relation between disclosed audit 
committee effectiveness variables and the audit opinion expressed. For instance, this 
study regards an outcome of unqualified opinion with no findings as an indication of 
higher financial reporting quality as a result of the disclosed audit committee 
characteristics and oversight of financial reporting, and assurance processes, as 
discussed in Sections 1.4 and 2.3.2.1. 
 
 Dependent variable Ranked value 
Unqualified opinion with no findings  5 
Unqualified opinion with findings  4 
Qualified audit opinion 3 
Adverse audit opinion 2 
Disclaimer of audit opinion 1 
Audit outstanding  0 
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3.9.1.2 Independent variables 
 
Independent variables are variables that predict the outcome of dependent variables 
(Creswell 2014:84), and these can be manipulated to influence an outcome (Creswell 
& Creswell 2018:51). Disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables were used as 
independent variables for the purposes of this study. Thus, the audit committee 
effectiveness variables are expected to influence the outcome of the external audit 
opinion obtained.  
 
This study used audit committee characteristics and oversight of financial reporting 
and assurance processes as audit committee effectiveness variables. The National 
Treasury issues the “Annual Report Guide for Schedule 3A and 3C Public Entities” 
which includes required disclosures in the annual reports and an annexure dealing 
specifically with required disclosures by audit committees titled “Report of the Audit 
committee” (RSA 2017:23-24).  
 
The King III Code provides guidance on audit committee characteristics and oversight 
of financial reporting and assurance processes. Organisations were expected to apply 
or explain how they have applied the recommendations of the King III Code (IODSA 
2009:5) associated with each principle. It is the board’s responsibility to disclose how 
they decided to apply the recommendations differently or disclose if they have applied 
another practice to achieve the same objectives of the principles (IODSA 2009a:5). 
This study used the recommendations in the King III Code as the 49 audit committee 
effectiveness variables for the purposes of factor analysis. Each of the individual 
independent variables was coded as “1” if disclosed in the annual report and “-1” if not 
disclosed. The term ‘individual independent variable’ refers to an individual variable 
included in the 49 independent variables used in this study. Exceptions were made in 
the measurements of audit committee meetings and size. As discussed in Sections 
2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.4, the King III Code recommends the audit committee to meet at 
least twice a year, and the audit committee size to be equal to three or more members. 
A code of “1” was given when a department disclosed that it had adhered to the King 
III Code recommended practices on the minimum number of meetings and the number 
of audit committee members (size), and “-1” if it had not adhered to these 
recommended practices. Appendix A provides the list of individual independent 
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variables, including their definitions and keywords used to identify them during the 
content analysis of annual reports.  
 
3.9.2 Data analysis and procedures  
 
For the analysis of the data, the SPSS version 25 software was used. The data 
analysis included descriptive statistics, factor analysis – CATPCA – and multivariate 
regression. Data analysis was conducted in three phases as discussed in the following 
sub-sections. For Phase 1, the literature and a discussion on the use and results of 
descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies are presented. For Phase 2, the 
literature and a discussion on the factor analysis in the form of CATPCA is provided, 
for Phase 3, the literature and a discussion on the multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression analysis technique is provided.  
 
3.9.2.1 Phase 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics technique – in the form of frequencies – was used as a pre-
step for CATPCA. Descriptive statistics aim to describe the collected data as it is 
(Leedy & Ormrod 2015:154). The frequencies were used to determine the number of 
departments that disclosed each independent and dependent variable. Further, in 
Phase 2, descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies were used for further analysis 
of audit committee effectiveness variables expected to contribute to the primary 
objective of this study; these results were used when forming factors. In this sub-
section, the results of the descriptive statistics on individual independent variables and 
dependent variables are discussed and presented. 
 
Descriptive statistics results – 49 individual independent variables 
The frequencies were run in SPSS in order to determine which of the 49 variables 
contributed towards achieving the primary objective of this study on the basis of their 
variability.  
 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for all 49 individual 
independent variables of the sampled 93 central government departments. The 
statistics reflect the percentage of departments that disclosed each individual 
70 
 
independent variable. Disclosure simply means the department disclosed the audit 
committee effectiveness variable, not that the variable was actually or correctly 
implemented.  
 
Table 3.3: Frequencies of disclosure of audit committee (AC)6 effectiveness 
variables 
No 
Audit committee effectiveness variables 
Number of the 93 
central government 
departments that 
disclosed each variable 
1 
AC Composition, duties and purpose in 
memorandum of incorporation 
93 
2 AC review content of summarised information 93 
3 
AC engage the external auditors to provide 
assurance on the summarised financial 
information 
93 
4 AC risk management role described in charter 93 
5 
AC reports to board on its statutory and 
assigned duties 
93 
6 
AC reports to shareholders how statutory 
duties were carried out 
93 
7 Established AC 92 
8 
Number of AC meetings per annum equal or 
more than two 
92 
9 
AC reports to shareholders the AC view on 
financial statements and accounting practices 
92 
10 
AC review and comment on Financial 
Statements 
91 
11 
AC provided summary of role and details on 
composition, number of meetings and activities 
in integrated report 
91 
12 
Number of AC members equal or more than 
three 
89 
13 Chairman of AC is not chairman of Board 89 
14 
Statement that AC has sufficient qualifications 
and experience 
76 
15 AC meets with internal audit annually 68 
16 
Info published that supports independence and 
capacity of AC members 
63 
17 AC approves internal audit plan 60 
18 
AC reports to shareholders whether internal 
financial controls are effective 
55 
19 AC meets with External auditors annually 46 
                                            
6 Abbreviation for audit committee (AC) is used when referring to variable names.  
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No 
Audit committee effectiveness variables 
Number of the 93 
central government 
departments that 
disclosed each variable 
20 
AC ensure that combined assurance received 
is appropriate to face all significant risk 
28 
21 
AC oversight of information technology risk 
related to financial reporting 
21 
22 AC oversight of financial reporting risk 20 
23 AC oversight of internal financial controls 15 
24 
AC oversight of fraud risk related to financial 
reporting 
10 
25 AC terms of reference approved by Board 9 
26 Statement that AC members keep up to date 2 
27 
AC ensures that internal audit function is 
subject to independent quality review 
1 
28 Statement that AC may consult 0 
29 
Statement that board fills AC vacancies / 
details if not 
0 
30 
Statement that board elects AC chair / details if 
not 
0 
31 
Statement that board chair involved in setting/ 
agreeing AC agenda 
0 
32 
AC chair present at annual general meeting - 
Minutes of annual general meeting 
0 
33 
AC have regard to all factors and risks that 
may impact on the integrity of the integrated 
report 
0 
34 
AC review disclosure of sustainability issues in 
integrated report 
0 
35 
AC recommends to the board to engage an 
external assurance provider on material 
sustainability issues 
0 
36 AC considers the need to issue interim results 0 
37 
AC monitors relationship between external 
assurance providers and company 
0 
38 
AC performs annual review of the finance 
function 
0 
39 
Results of finance function review is disclosed 
in integrated report 
0 
40 
AC is responsible for the appointment/ 
dismissal and/or performance assessment of 
chief audit executive 
0 
41 
AC is responsible for the appointment 
performance assessment of chief audit 
executive 
0 
42 AC nominates external auditor for appointment 0 
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No 
Audit committee effectiveness variables 
Number of the 93 
central government 
departments that 
disclosed each variable 
43 
AC approves terms of engagement and 
remuneration of external auditor 
0 
44 
AC monitors and reports on independence of 
external auditor 
0 
45 
AC define policy and approves non-audit 
services by external auditor 
0 
46 
AC informed of reportable irregularities 
identified and reported on by external auditor 
0 
47 
AC review quality and effectiveness of external 
audit process 
0 
48 
AC reports to shareholders its satisfaction with 
independence of external auditors 
0 
49 
AC recommends integrated report for approval 
to the board 
0 
Source: Author 
 
The results presented in Table 3.3 identify the six of the 49 audit committee 
effectiveness variables which all 93 departments disclosed and the 11 audit committee 
effectiveness variables which were disclosed by more than 90% of the departments. 
Overall, the majority of the departments disclosed only 18 or less out of the total of 49 
(36.7%) audit committee effectiveness variables. Thus, in most departments, less than 
half of the audit committee effectiveness variables were disclosed. Table 3.3 further 
identifies the 22 of the 49 (44.9%) audit committee effectiveness variables which were 
not disclosed by a single department  as well as the nine of the 49 (18.4%) audit 
committee effectiveness variables which were disclosed by less than 50% of the 
departments. It can therefore, be concluded that most departments failed to meet at 
least 50% of the disclosures related to audit committee effectiveness variables 
recommended in the King III Code.  
 
Only individual independent variables that indicated variability across departments 
were used for further descriptive analysis. Individual independent variables that were 
either present or absent (indicated by 0 (22 variables) and 93 (6 variables)) in all 
departments’ disclosures were omitted from further analysis as they could not 
contribute to achieving the primary objective of this study. In addition, individual 
independent variables that were disclosed by or absent from disclosures of 5% or less 
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of the departments were also excluded from further data analysis as their contribution 
to achieving the primary objective of this study would be insignificant.  
 
Table 3.3 lists 14 of the 49 audit committee effectiveness variables that were 
considered to have significant variability (5% or more to either side of disclosed or not 
disclosed). A 5% variability was used to obtain optimal results from CATPCA. Given 
that a limited number of the variables showed even the 5% variability between 
disclosed and non-disclosed, this also ensured as many of the variables were used 
for further data analysis. As these 14 variables contributed to achieving the primary 
objective of this study, they were analysed further in Phase 2 and Phase 3.  
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Table 3.4: Audit committee effectiveness variables with variability  
No Audit committee effectiveness variable 
1 Number of AC members equal to or more than three 
2 Chairman of AC is not the chairman of Board 
3 A statement that AC has sufficient qualifications and experience 
4 AC meets with internal auditors annually 
5 
The information published supports the independence and 
expertise of AC members 
6 AC approves internal audit plan 
7 
AC reports to shareholders whether internal financial controls 
are effective 
8 AC meets with external auditors annually 
9 
AC ensures that combined assurance received is appropriate to 
address all significant risks 
10 
AC oversight of information technology risk related to financial 
reporting 
11 AC oversight of financial reporting risk 
12 AC oversight of internal financial controls 
13 AC oversight of fraud risk related to financial reporting 
14 AC terms of reference approved by Board 
Source: Author 
 
In this section, a discussion and results of the descriptive statistics in the form of 
frequencies were presented. The variations present in 14 audit committee 
effectiveness variables indicated they contributed to achieving the primary objective 
of this study. These variables were analysed further in Phases 2 and 3. The next 
section offers the literature and discussion on factor analysis using CATPCA as the 
statistical method employed for further data analyses in this study.  
 
3.9.2.2 Phase 2: Factor development (CATPCA) for further data analysis  
 
Factor analysis is defined as a statistical technique used to reduce or condense the 
information contained in a number of individual variables into a small set of new, 
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composite dimensions or variables, with minimum loss of information (Hair, Black, 
Babin & Anderson 2010:96). The word ‘factor’ refers to the linear combination of 
original variables (Hair et al. 2010:92). In this study, the term ‘factor variable’ is used 
to refer to a new independent variable formed using CATPCA.  
 
According to Hair et al. (2010:98), there are two types of factor analysis, namely data 
summarisation and data reduction. With data summarisation, the variables are not 
reduced, but the researcher can view the set of variables at various levels of 
generalisation, ranging from the most detailed level to the more generalised level (Hair 
et al. 2010:98). Data reduction, on the other hand, is achieved by (1) identifying 
representative variables from a much larger set of variables to be used in multivariate 
analysis, and (2) creating a new set of variables, much smaller in number, to partly or 
entirely replace the original set of variables (Hair et al. 2010:99).  
 
The method of factor analysis with the aim of data reduction used in this study is known 
as CATPCA. According to Linting and van der Kooij (2012:13), CATPCA is used to 
analyse nonlinear relationships between variables. This study employed the SPSS 
software tool to implement CATPCA. CATPCA is commonly used when the researcher 
is using a large number of categorical variables and want to reduce the number of 
variables (Kemalbay & Korkmazoğlu 2014:731). Prior studies on audit committee 
effectiveness tended to use one or a small number of individual audit committee 
variables as proxies for audit committee effectiveness. For instance, most studies 
used independence, financial expertise, number of meetings, size and the chair of the 
audit committee individually or in combination as a proxy for audit committee 
effectiveness (Buallay 2018:185; Madi et al. 2015:487; Othman et al. 2014:331). 
However, this study focused on audit committee effectiveness variables identified from 
the King III Code to make statistical sense of their combined impact on the dependent 
variable, namely the external audit opinion expressed. CATPCA was therefore,  
employed to statistically reduce the 14 individual independent variables (expected to 
contribute to the primary objective of this study) based on their factor loadings, in order 
to determine their combined impact on the external audit opinion expressed (used as 
a proxy for financial reporting quality). 
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As an applicable pre-step to this regression, the CATPCA method was adopted to 
categorise the 14 individual independent variables in order to operationailise the data 
collected to develop hypotheses. CATPCA was also employed to deal with a possible 
multicollinearity problem among the various binary variables, and the resulting 
uncorrelated factors were used for further analysis instead of original possibly 
correlated variables. 
 
In order to design the factor analysis, the sample size should be considered. The 
sample size of this study consisted of 93 central government departments, which was 
appropriate for using CAPTCA as a factor analysis method. The ‘rule of thumb 3-1’ 
requires a minimum of 50 units for CAPTCA as factor analysis method (Hair et al. 
2010:102). Furthermore, the ratio of departments per variable was 6.6:1 (93/14), which 
fell within the acceptable limits. 
 
To assess the appropriateness of the CATPCA method and the factorability of the 
individual independent variables, Hair et al. (2010:129) suggested that visual analysis 
of the correlation are performed and identified independent variables are correlated. 
This is done by considering the correlation matrix that indicates the inter-correlation 
among all variables (Hair et al. 2010:92). A correlation coefficient of a 1 or -1 indicates 
a perfect correlation, while a correlation coefficient of 0 indicates that there is no 
relationship between variables. According to Hair et al. (2010:95), correlation analysis 
assists the researcher to test the validity and variability of the formed factors and to 
check for correlation among the variables in order to reduce redundancy in possible 
multicollinearity. The Pearson correlation coefficient test was used to test the validity 
and reliability of the formed factors. Table 4.8 presents the results of the Pearson 
correlation coefficients for the factors formed after application of CATPCA. 
 
Determining the number of factors to be formed  
The maximum number of factors that can be formed is equal to the total number of 
individual independent variables used in the study. In this study, 14 individual 
independent variables were used for further data analysis. In order to determine the 
number of factors resulting from the CATPCA, the Eigenvalues and Cronbach’s Alpha 
were considered. Eigenvalues indicate a number of variances accounted for in a factor 
(Hair et al. 2010:92), and only assists in determining the optimal number of factors that 
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needs to be created in order to determine the amount of variance of the original 
variables that is accounted for by the factors with an eigenvalue above 1 are 
considered as significant (Hair et al. 2010:109). Together with the Eigenvalue, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients were calculated in order to ensure reliability of the 
factors. Cronbach’s Alpha is a reliability coefficient, which is able to examine the 
consistency of variables. In general, a Cronbach’s Alpha value  of 0.7 is considered 
as a minimum to indicate consistency, although a lower value of 0.6 may be 
considered based on the nature of the data (Hair et al. 2010:125). Figure 4.1 provides 
the Scree Plot populated from the CATPCA and Table 4.1 presents both the 
Eigenvalues and Cronbach’s Alpha results. The next step is to examine the factor 
loadings.  
 
Examining the factor loading and labelling of the factors formed 
According to Hair et al. (2010:92), factor loading is defined as the “correlation between 
the original variables and the factors, the key to understanding the key nature of a 
particular factor”. Thus, it may prove difficult to give the factor an all-inclusive name. 
With the aim of data reduction, the factors are used to identify variables for further data 
analysis with other techniques or make factors themselves (Hair et al. 2010:99). 
 
Factor loadings of approximately 0.3 to 0.4 are considered to meet the minimum value 
in order to assist in determining and interpreting the underlying structure of the 
variables (Hair et al. 2010:117). Factor loadings of 0.5 or above are considered to be 
significant (Hair et al. 2010:117). In order to determine the structure of the variables 
and assist in the formation of factor variables, the four factor variables that met the 
assumptions of factor loadings of greater than 0.3 in absolute value are presented in 
Table 4.2 to Table 4.5.  
 
The four factor variables formulated following the results of the CATPCA analysis, 
which were used during further data analysis are:  
 
1. AC statutory reporting oversight (3 variables) 
2. AC risk and control oversight (4 variables) 
3. AC assurance effectiveness oversight (4 variables) 
4. AC structure and profile (3 variables) 
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A further discussion and interpretation of the results of the factor loading is presented 
in Section 4.2 of this study. These four factor variables, subsuming the 14 individual 
independent variables that contribute to achieving the primary objective of this study, 
are used as new audit committee effectiveness variables. As an applicable pre-step 
in multiple regression, the CATPCA method was adopted to reduce the 14 individual 
independent variables in order to operationalise the collected data to develop 
hypotheses.  
 
Hypotheses development for further data analysis  
To achieve the objective of this study, CATPCA was employed to reduce and 
categorise the 14 independent variables into factor variables as a basis for developing 
hypotheses (Section 4.2) for further data analyses. The number of developed 
hypotheses is equal to the number of formulated factor variables.  
 
This section provided supporting literature and a discussion on the appropriateness of 
the use of CATPCA for the purposes of this study. In the next section, the statistical 
technique, namely multivariate ordinal logistic regression, will be discussed as the 
method used to test the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and the external audit opinion expressed. 
 
3.9.2.3 Phase 3: Further data analysis using multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression  
 
This section discusses the multivariate ordinal logistic regression used to test the 
relation between audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit 
opinion expressed. Causality refers to the method used when one variable is expected 
to predict the outcome of another variable (Creswell & Creswell 2018:49). In this study, 
audit committee effectiveness variables were used to test the outcome of the external 
audit opinion expressed. Quantitative hypotheses are used to predict the existence of 
a relationship between two or more variables (Creswell & Creswell 2018:136; Babbie 
& Mouton 2001:643). The use of quantitative hypotheses was appropriate in this study, 
as the aim is to test for causality.  
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According to Babbie and Mouton (2001:466), multiple regression is used when the 
dependent variable is simultaneously affected by several independent variables. In 
this study, the impact of various audit committee effectiveness variables on the 
external audit opinion expressed was tested, thus the use of multiple logistic 
regression is appropriate. According to Hair et al. (2010:169), multiple regression has 
two objectives; to maximise the overall power of the independent variables and to 
compare two or more independent variables to determine the predictive power of each 
variable. This study aimed to determine the impact of each of the four factor variables 
on the external audit opinion expressed.  
 
Ordinal logistic regression focuses on the relationship between a set of predictors and 
an ordinal response variable (Frost 2019:1). According to O’Connell (2006a:2), “the 
primary characteristics of ordinal data is that the numbers assigned to successive 
categories of the variables being measured represent the difference in magnitude or 
a ‘greater than’ or ‘less than’ quality”. Similarly, Kothari (2004:71) also indicated that 
the ordinal scale implies a statement ‘greater than’ and ‘less than’, and that an equality 
statement is also appropriate. Thus, it is an easy way to differentiate between possible 
outcomes, which can best be considered as rank-ordered (O’Connell 2006a:2). The 
dependent variables (different types of external audit opinions) were ranked in order 
of their degree of quality and were presented in Section 3.9.1.1 of this study.  
 
For the purpose of hypotheses testing, non-parametric methods were used to 
measure the statistical significance of the relation between audit committee 
effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed. The parametric and 
non-parametric tests were used to test the hypotheses, and they are also known as 
tests of significance (Kothari 2004:195). Non-parametric tests are used to measure 
the relationship between two variables when the data are in ranked format (Kothari 
2004:139), while the parametric technique is used to test interval data. Since this study 
tested the relationship between two variables, with the dependent variable being 
ordinal, the non-parametric technique was appropriate. 
 
In this section, the literature on the multivariate ordinal logistic regression was 
provided. The next section offers a brief discussion of the evaluation of the quality of 
the results of this study.  
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3.10  QUALITY CONSIDERATION 
 
Since this study was quantitative in nature, the validity and reliability of the data results 
are discussed. Validity is concerned with whether the collected data measure what it 
is supposed to measure. Collected data are used to address the objectives of the 
study (Saunders et al. 2009:273). This study used annual reports to identify the 
disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables. Thus, the information identified 
from the annual reports related to the disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables. The annual reports were therefore deemed valid to measure the disclosure 
of audit committee effectiveness variables.  
 
In order to comply with the PFMA requirements, accounting officers are mandated to 
compile annual reports. The accounting officers use the annual reports to report on 
government spending and present how the department performed against the targets 
set for the year (AGSA 2017:144). For the annual reports to be considered as ‘good 
quality’, the reports are expected to comply with the statutory and policy requirements 
and present both positive and negative information in an understandable and concise 
manner (RSA 2017:4). The information reported in the annual reports should be 
reliable and credible, with the accounting officer being responsible for the preparation 
and the audit committee for the oversight thereof.  
 
The publicly available annual reports for the financial year ended 2014/15 were 
collected from the provincial and national government department websites. Audit 
committee effectiveness variables were coded using the annual reports. The annual 
reports for all 93 departments were found and used for the purposes of this study.  
 
According to Hair et al. (2010:93), reliability is described as the “extend to which 
variable or set of variables is consistent in what it is intended to measure”. Reliability 
is a matter of whether particular techniques would arrive at the same results if they 
were to be repeated (Babbie & Mouton 2001:119). If multiple measurements are taken, 
reliability measures will all be consistent in their values. Cronbach’s Alpha is another 
form of test to determine the internal consistency of an instrument (Heale & Twycross 
2015:67; Hair et al. 2010:125). Internal consistency is described as the extent to which 
all the items on a scale measure one construct (Heale & Twycross 2015:67). In this 
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study, the results of Cronbach Alpha test were used during the CATPCA process in 
order to ensure reliability of the factor variables as discussed in section 3.9.2.2. of 
which the results on the CATPCA method are presented in Section 4.2. Appendix A 
also presents the audit committee variables used and the aspect coded during content 
analysis of annual reports used to ensure that the data used is reliable and that the 
study replicated on the same population. The next section briefly discusses how the 
results of the analysed data would be presented. 
 
3.11  INTERPRETING THE ANALYSED DATA AND PRESENTING THE 
RESULTS  
 
There are different ways of communicating and displaying analysed data, which 
includes text, tables, graphs and statistical measures (Kumar 2011:258). For the 
purposes of this study, the analysed results were communicated using text and 
displayed using tables, figures and graphs in the form of bar, Scree Plot and column 
charts.  
 
3.12  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Research ethics implications were considered in this study. The analysed data were 
in the form of secondary data contained in the annual reports of the national and 
provincial departments. The annual reports were downloadable from the public 
domain. The researcher intends to keep the downloaded annual reports and the coded 
spreadsheets for a period of five years and store them safely. Ethical clearance was 
obtained from UNISA prior to the collection of the data. Specifically, approval was 
received from the Research Ethics Review Committee within the College of 
Accounting Sciences on the 8 June 2016 with reference number 2016_CAS_028.  
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3.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This chapter described the research process followed in this study. Each step within 
the research process was discussed under different sections. The literature and a 
discussion on the formulation of the research problem, objective and philosophy were 
also provided. Quantitative content analysis was also discussed as the research 
method employed in this study.  
 
The purposive sampling technique was chosen as a data selection method, and 93 
central government departments were selected based on their audit opinion 
outcomes. The different data analysis methods employed in three phases were 
discussed, and descriptive statistics and the results of the overall individual 
independent and dependent variables in the form of frequencies were presented in 
Phase 1. CATPCA, as a data reduction method using factor analysis, was discussed 
in Phase 2. Multivariate ordinal regression data analysis as a method to test the 
hypotheses was discussed in Phase 3. Quality considerations, the methods to be used 
to interpret and present analysed data, and the results and ethical considerations were 
also considered. 
 
In the next chapter, the results obtained from the three phases of data analysis are 
presented and discussed. 
  
83 
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
In the previous chapter, the data analysis methods employed in this study were 
discussed. The results of Phase 1 – descriptive statistics on individual independent 
variables – were also discussed and presented. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present the results of further data analysis performed in Phase 2 and Phase 3. Phase 
2 used factor analysis, particularly the CATPCA method and descriptive statistics on 
the newly formed factor variables. Phase 3 employed multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression analysis to test the hypotheses developed from further data analysis in 
Phase 2. 
 
Multivariate ordinal logistic regression revealed the relation between factor variables 
as proxies of disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit 
opinion expressed. The chapter ends by summarising the results of the statistical 
analysis.  
 
4.2  PHASE 2: FACTOR DEVELOPMENT (CATPCA) FOR FURTHER DATA 
ANALYSIS  
 
The results of Phase 2 are divided into two sections, namely factor formation and 
further descriptive statistics on factor variables.  
 
4.2.1  Factor formation - CATPCA 
 
In this section, the results of factor formation using the CATPCA method are presented 
in the form of texts, tables and graphs. First, the eigenvalue and Cronbach Alpha 
results are presented in order to test the validity and reliability of the factors, followed 
by the presentation of the factor loading of each factor variable that was formed; these 
are referred to as factor variables for the purposes of this study. Using the new factor 
variable names, four hypotheses were also developed and are presented under each 
factor variable’s discussion.  
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In order to determine the number of factor variables resulting from the CATPCA, the 
eigenvalues and Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients were considered as discussed in 
Section 3.9.2.2. Figure 4.1 provides the Scree Plot reflecting the eigenvalues of the 
14 individual independent variables used for further analysis.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Scree plot 
Extraction Method: CATPCA  
Source: Author 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the scree plot indicates that four factors (components) can 
be identified based on an Eigenvalue greater than 1. Table 4.1 presents the 
Eigenvalue and Cronbach Alpha coefficient for each of the four factor variables that is 
used for further data analysis. The first factor recorded an Eigenvalue of 2.710 and 
explained 19.3% of the variance in the transformed variables. The Eigenvalue of the 
second factor was 2.199, that accounted for 15.7% of the variance. The third and 
fourth factors represented similar portions of the variance of the underlying variables.  
Thus, all four factors combined accounted for 63.1% of the variance.   
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Table 4.1:  Cronbach Alpha coefficient and eigenvalues of factor variables 
Factor 
Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient 
Total (Eigenvalue) 
% of Variance 
accounted for 
1 0.718 2.710 19.355 
2 0.614 2.199 15.705 
3 0.605 1.981 14.153 
4 0.626 1.951 13.934 
Total .955b 8.841 63.147 
Extraction Method: CATPCA  
Source: Author 
 
Four factor variables had Cronbach Alpha above 0.6. Thus, sufficient support exists 
for the formation of four factor variables for further analysis. For the purposes of 
labelling the factor variables, the individual independent variables factor loadings were 
considered.  
 
Examining the factor loading, labelling of the factor variables formed and 
hypotheses development for further data analysis  
Table 4.2 to Table 4.5 present the factor loadings of the four factor variables that were 
formed. As discussed in Section 3.9.2.2, only individual independent variables that 
yielded a factor loading value of above 0.6 are considered significant, and individual 
independent variables with factor loadings between 0.3 to 0.4 are considered as a 
minimum in order to be included in that factor variable. The four factor variables that 
were formed were further used in the development of the hypotheses as inputs for 
Phase 3 of data analysis. The hypotheses are also presented below, along with a 
discussion of each factor variable.  
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Table 4.2:  Factor variable 1 - AC statutory reporting oversight 
Individual independent variables subsumed in 
factor variable 1 
Factor loading 
AC reports to shareholders whether internal 
financial controls are effective 
0.832 
Information disclosed that supports independence 
and expertise of AC members 
0.763 
AC meets with internal auditors annually 0.521 
Extraction Method: CATPCA  
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.2 presents factor variable 1, consisting of three of the 14 individual 
independent variables (21.4%). CAPTCA shows that all individual independent 
variables load on one factor with Cronbach Alpha of 0.718 as presented in Table 4.1. 
Each individual independent variable had a factor loading ranging from 0.521-0.832, 
which is considered to be acceptable. Factor variable 1 was labelled “AC statutory 
reporting oversight” as all the variables disclose proxies of effective AC oversight of 
statutory reporting. South African studies reported disclosure of audit committee 
oversight were insufficient; these studies posited that audit committees were doing 
more than they disclosed (Moloi 2015:67; Marx & Voogt 2010:17; Marx 2009:31). 
Thus, higher levels of disclosure on audit committee statutory reporting oversight are 
likely to indicate more effective oversight, and a higher level of financial reporting 
quality. Considering an unqualified opinion with no findings is used as a proxy of the 
highest level of financial reporting quality, the following hypothesis was developed: 
 
H1 There is a positive association between AC statutory reporting oversight 
and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
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Table 4.3: Factor variable 2 - AC risk and control oversight  
Individual independent variables subsumed in 
factor variable 2 
Factor loading 
AC oversight of financial reporting risk 0.909 
AC oversight of internal financial controls 0.824 
AC oversight of fraud risk related to financial 
reporting 
0.820 
AC oversight of information technology risk related 
to financial reporting 
0.610 
Extraction Method: CATPCA  
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.3 presents four of the 14 individual independent variables (28.6%) subsumed 
in factor variable 2. CAPTCA shows that all individual independent variables load on 
one factor with Cronbach Alpha of 0.614 as presented in Table 4.1. Each individual 
independent variable had a factor loading ranging from 0.610-0.909, which is 
considered to be significant. Factor variable 2 is labelled as “AC risk and control 
oversight”, as each individual variable deals with either control or risk oversight by the 
audit committee. All individual variables included in this factor variable are 
recommended under Principle 3.8 of the King III Code, which states that “The audit 
committee should be an integral component of the risk management process” (IODSA 
2009a: Principle 3.8). As discussed in Section 2.3.2.4, risk management plays an 
important role in enhancing financial reporting quality (Cohen et al. 2017:1204). 
Therefore, it can be expected that higher levels of disclosure about “AC risk and 
control oversight” is likely to indicate more effective oversight, and a higher level of 
financial reporting quality. Considering an unqualified opinion with no findings is used 
as a proxy of the highest level of financial reporting quality, the following hypothesis 
was developed: 
 
H2 There is a positive association between AC risk and control oversight and 
an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
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Table 4.4: Factor variable 3 - AC assurance effectiveness oversight  
Individual independent variables subsumed in factor variable 3 
Factor 
loading 
AC approves the internal audit plan 0.776 
AC meets with external auditors annually 0.729 
AC ensures that combined assurance received is appropriate to face all 
significant risks 
0.668 
AC terms of reference approved by Board 0.565 
Extraction Method: CATPCA  
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.4 presents four of the 14 individual independent variables (28.6%) subsumed 
in factor variable 3. CAPTCA shows that all individual independent variables load on 
one factor with Cronbach Alpha of 0.605, as presented in Table 4.1. Each individual 
independent variable had a factor loading ranging from 0.565-0.776, which is 
considered to be acceptable. Factor variable 3 is labelled as “AC assurance 
effectiveness oversight”, as three of the individual variables relate to oversight of 
internal and external assurance providers, while the fourth individual variable, “AC 
terms of reference”, indirectly contributes to the oversight by sensitising the audit 
committee to its oversight responsibilities. Audit committee oversight of assurance 
providers is essential for ensuring the effectiveness of assurance services (Al-Mamun, 
Yasser, Rahman, Wickramasinghe & Nathan 2014:900; Zaman & Sarens 2013:506). 
The interactions between the audit committee and the internal auditors, external 
auditors and management influence the effectiveness of oversight (Zaman & Sarens 
2013:498). Furthermore, interactions enable the audit committees to resolve conflicts 
between assurance providers and management, enhancing the effectiveness of the 
assurance providers (Klein 2002:378).  
 
An audit committee that often meets with the external auditors was found to improve 
the audit quality (Beattie et al. 2013:56). Meetings between the audit committee and 
the external auditors also improve the effectiveness of the audit process, while the 
audit committee’s oversight of internal audit activities improves the internal audit 
function (Abdullah et al. 2018:1). Thus, “AC assurance effectiveness oversight” is 
essential for a higher quality of financial reporting. Considering an unqualified opinion 
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with no findings is used as a proxy of the highest level of financial reporting quality, 
the following hypothesis was developed: 
 
H3 There is a positive association between AC assurance effectiveness 
oversight and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
Table 4.5: Factor variable 4 - AC structure and profile 
Individual independent variables subsumed in factor variable 4 
Factor 
loading 
AC is not the chairman of Board 0.827 
AC members equal to or more than three 0.751 
AC has sufficient qualifications and experience 0.712 
Extraction Method: CATPCA  
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.5 presents three of the 14 individual independent variables (21.4%) subsumed 
in factor variable 4. CAPTCA shows that all individual independent variables load on 
one factor with Cronbach Alpha of 0.626 as presented in Table 4.1. Each individual 
independent variable had a factor loading ranging from 0.712-0.827, which is 
considered to be significant. This factor variable is labelled “AC structure and profile” 
as all the individual variables relate to audit committee characteristics. As discussed 
in Section 2.3.1, audit committee characteristics are commonly used as proxies of 
audit committee effectiveness (Kibiya et al. 2016:126; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 
2013:381). The literature reports that these characteristics affect the effectiveness of 
oversight that is provided (Buallay 2018:185; Madi et al. 2015:487; Othman et al. 
2014:331). For example, the audit committee chair, size, qualifications and experience 
determine financial reporting quality (Appiah & Amon 2017:298; Inaam & Khamoussi 
2016:179; Ghafran & O’Sullivan 2013:381). Further literature on the audit committee 
chair was provided in Section 2.1.3.5, audit committee size was discussed in Section 
2.1.3.4, and audit committee qualifications and experience were discussed in Section 
2.1.3.2. Considering an unqualified opinion with no findings is used as a proxy for the 
highest level of financial reporting quality, the following hypothesis was developed: 
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H4 There is a positive association between AC structure and profile and an 
unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
Comparison of King III Code recommended practices and the PFMA and 
National Treasury Regulations 
In order to motivate the importance of the 14 individual independent variables 
(identified from King III Code) being subjected to further data analyses on the basis of 
the variable disclosures across departments, they were compared to public sector 
legislation. Table 4.6 presents the comparison.  
 
Table 4.6: Comparison between the recommended practices of the King III 
Code and the regulations of the PFMA and National Treasury 
  
No 
Audit committee 
(AC) effectiveness 
variables (IODSA 
2009a) 
Addressed in 
legislation 
(tick) or not (x) 
PFMA (RSA 1999) & National 
Treasury Regulation (RSA 
2005) 
1 
AC Terms of 
reference approved 
by the board 
√ RSA (2005: Section 27.1.7) It 
must be disclosed in the entity’s 
annual report whether or not the 
audit committee has adopted 
formal terms of reference, and if 
so, whether the committee 
satisfied its responsibilities for 
the year in compliance with its 
terms of reference. 
Approval of the 
terms of 
reference in 
regulation not 
addressed 
2 
AC meets with 
internal audit annually 
x 
Not addressed. 
3 
AC meets with 
external auditors 
annually 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 27.1.13 & 
3.1.16) The audit committee 
must meet at least annually with 
the Auditor-General or the 
external auditor, whichever 
applicable, to ensure that there 
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No 
Audit committee 
(AC) effectiveness 
variables (IODSA 
2009a) 
Addressed in 
legislation 
(tick) or not (x) 
PFMA (RSA 1999) & National 
Treasury Regulation (RSA 
2005) 
are no unresolved issues of 
concern. 
4 
The information 
published supports 
the independence and 
expertise of AC 
members 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 3.1.5) Audit 
committees must be constituted 
to ensure their independence, 
and their membership must be 
disclosed in the annual report of 
the institution. 
5 
Number of AC 
members equal to or 
more than three 
√ 
RSA (1999: Section 77(a)) 
Must consist of at least three 
persons. 
6 
Chairman of AC is not 
the chairman of the 
board 
√  RSA (1999: Section 77(a)(ii)) 
Chairperson may not be in the 
employ of the department. 
Independence of 
audit committee 
addressed by 
both, but 
different 
7 
A statement that AC 
has sufficient 
qualifications and 
experience 
√ 
Similar by 
implication 
RSA (2005: Section 27.1.4) The 
majority of persons serving on 
an audit committee must be 
financially literate. 
8 
AC ensures that 
combined assurance 
received is 
appropriate to face all 
significant risks 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 27.1.8)  
The audit committee must, 
among others, review the 
following: 
(b) the effectiveness of internal 
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No 
Audit committee 
(AC) effectiveness 
variables (IODSA 
2009a) 
Addressed in 
legislation 
(tick) or not (x) 
PFMA (RSA 1999) & National 
Treasury Regulation (RSA 
2005) 
audit (RSA 2005: Section 
27.2.9). 
The internal audit function must 
co-ordinate with other internal 
and external providers of 
assurance to ensure proper 
coverage and to minimise 
duplication of effort. 
9 
AC approves internal 
audit plan 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 3.2.7) An 
internal audit function must 
prepare, in consultation with 
and for approval by the audit 
committee- 
(c) plans indicating the 
proposed scope of each audit in 
the annual internal audit plan.  
10 
AC oversight of 
internal financial 
controls 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 3.1.13(a)) 
the effectiveness of the internal 
control. 
11 
AC oversight of 
financial reporting risk 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 27.1.8(c))  
the risk areas of the entity’s 
operations to be covered in the 
scope of internal and external 
audits. 
12 
AC oversight of fraud 
risk related to financial 
reporting 
√ 
13 
AC oversight of 
information 
technology risk 
related to financial 
reporting 
√ 
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No 
Audit committee 
(AC) effectiveness 
variables (IODSA 
2009a) 
Addressed in 
legislation 
(tick) or not (x) 
PFMA (RSA 1999) & National 
Treasury Regulation (RSA 
2005) 
14 
AC reports to 
shareholders whether 
internal financial 
controls are effective 
√ 
RSA (2005: Section 3.1.13(a)) 
the effectiveness of the internal 
control. 
Source: Author 
 
A comparison of the disclosure requirements of King III Code (IODSA 2009), the 
PFMA (1999) and the National Treasury Regulations (2005), find that 13 of the 14 
(92.9%) individual independent variables used for further data analysis in Table 4.6 
are addressed by all three sources, thus constituting legislated disclosure 
requirements.  
 
However, some of the individual independent variables were addressed somewhat 
differently in legislation and regulation. For instance, the “AC terms of reference 
approved by board” variable was partially addressed in the legislation. The National 
Treasury Regulations only made reference to the terms of reference being adopted 
and not the approval thereof (RSA 2005: Section 27.1.7). Thus, it is unclear if these 
terms of reference were approved by the executive authority. Another variable which 
was not fully addressed in the legislation was “Chairman of AC is not the chairman of 
the board”. According to the PFMA (RSA 1999: Section 77(a)(ii)), the audit committee 
“chairperson may not be in the employ of the department”, which supports the King III 
Code recommended practice that the chair should not be an executive. However, the 
legislation does not state that the chair of the audit committee should not be the chair 
of the board, as recommended by the King III Code (IODSA 2009a: Recommended 
practice 3.2.3). Note that the board, in the context of a central government department, 
is referred to as the executive authority (Section 1.6 for more details). Another variable 
that was included in the legislation by implication is the recommendation that “A 
statement that AC has sufficient qualifications and experience” should be disclosed. 
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Legislation required the majority of the audit committee should be financially literate, 
implying minimum qualifications are required (RSA 2005: Section 27.1.4).  
 
The only one of the 14 individual independent variables from the King III Code which 
is not prescribed in the legislation or National Treasury Regulations is “AC meets with 
internal audit annually”. Thus, disclosure of this individual independent variable would 
imply voluntary disclosure by the central government departments. An audit committee 
that meets with the internal auditors is expected to be effective, as the audit committee 
is able to keep up to date with the affairs of the organisation with the assistance of 
internal audit (Abdullah et al. 2018:11; Zaman & Sarens 2013:512). Thus, this 
individual independent variable is considered as important as it forms part of the 
process followed by audit committees in the performance of their oversight of internal 
audit function, as discussed in Section 2.3.2.2.  
 
Thus, the disclosure of audit committee effectiveness variables is essential to enhance 
the stakeholders’ confidence in the value of audit committees in an organisation, as 
discussed in Section 2.4.  
 
4.2.2  Further descriptive statistics on factor variables 
 
Descriptive statistics on the four factor variables are presented in Table 4.7 in the form 
of minimum, maximum, means and standard deviations. These descriptive statistics 
are based on the minimums (0) and maximums (1 times the number of individual 
independent variable subsumed in the factor variable), disclosures by departments. 
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Table 4.7:  Descriptive statistics for the four factor variables 
Factor variables Population Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
AC statutory 
reporting oversight 
93 0.00 3.00 2.0000 1.08347 
AC risk and control 
oversight 
93 0.00 4.00 0.7097 1.23869 
AC assurance 
effectiveness 
oversight 
93 0.00 4.00 1.5376 1.24725 
AC structure and 
profile 
93 0.00 3.00 2.7312 0.62797 
Extraction Method: descriptive statistics 
Source: Author 
 
As depicted in Table 4.7, each factor variable had incidents where all or none of the 
individual variables subsumed in it were disclosed, or not disclosed by one or more 
departments. Incidents, where none of the individual variables were disclosed by a 
department, is alarming as most of the individual variables are legislated requirements 
(Section 4.2). The factor variable “AC structure and profile” had the most incidents of 
disclosure of all the individual variables by a department, reflected by its highest mean 
value of 2.7312, implying that almost all the departments disclosed all three of the 
independent variables included in this factor variable. This is followed by progressively 
fewer incidents of such disclosure for “AC statutory reporting oversight”, with a mean 
value of 2.000 out of a possible three independent variables. “AC assurance 
effectiveness oversight” with a mean of 1.5376 out of a possible four independent 
variables, and “AC risk and control oversight” with a mean of 0.7097 out of a possible 
four independent variables. Figures 4.2 to 4.5 provide further details of disclosure 
trends for each factor variable. 
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Figure 4.2: Factor variable 1: AC statutory reporting oversight 
Source: Author 
 
It is evident from Figure 4.2 that 44% (41 of 93) of the departments disclosed all three 
individual independent variables subsumed in this factor variable, while 69.9% (65 of 
93) disclosed at least two. The lower than expected disclosure rate can possibly be 
explained by the fact that one of the three individual independent variables included 
in this factor variable (AC meets with internal auditors annually) are not prescribed by 
legislation (PFMA and the National Treasury Regulations), as discussed in Section 
4.2.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Factor variable 2: AC risk and control oversight 
Source: Author 
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Only 6.5% (6 of 93) of departments disclosed all individual independent variables 
subsumed in the “AC risk and control oversight” factor variable, as presented in Figure 
4.3. Moreover, the majority of the departments (63) did not disclose any of the 
variables subsumed in this factor variable. This is concerning since all the individual 
independent variables included in this factor variable are prescribed by legislation. The 
non-disclosure could imply that the audit committees of central government 
departments are not meeting their expected risk management oversight 
responsibilities.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Factor variable 3: AC assurance effectiveness oversight  
Source: Author 
 
Only 5.4% (5 of 93) of departments disclosed all four individual independent variables 
subsumed in the “AC assurance effectiveness oversight” factor variable, as presented 
in Figure 4.4. Although one of the individual independent variables “AC terms of 
reference approved by board” is only partially addressed by legislation, as discussed 
in Section 4.2.1, the expectation was that the other three variables would have been 
disclosed by all the departments. This was clearly not the case. Only 25.8% (24 of 93) 
of the departments disclosed at least three of the individual independent variables.  
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Figure 4.5: Factor variable 4: AC structure and profile 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 4.5 presents the disclosure patterns for the “AC structure and profile” factor 
variable. All three of the individual independent variables subsumed in this factor 
variable are prescribed by legislation. This factor variable had the highest mean value 
(2,7312), meaning most departments disclosed all three individual independent 
variables in their annual reports. Figure 4.5 shows 80.6% (75 of 93) of the departments 
disclosed all three individual independent variables, while 94.6% (88 of 93) disclosed 
at least two. The reason for the high disclosure pattern may be that the information 
linked to the audit committee chair and the number of audit committee members are 
objective and more easily determinable than some of the other more subjective 
disclosures required.  
 
Figure 4.6 presents the frequencies for each type of external audit opinion obtained 
by departments.  
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Figure 4.6: External audit opinions obtained by departments  
Source: Author 
 
Figure 4.6 indicates only 35.5% (33 of 93) of the departments obtained unqualified 
audit opinions with no findings. The majority of 51.6% (48 of 93) of the departments, 
obtained an unqualified opinion with findings. The departments that obtained qualified 
audit opinion were 9.7% (9 of 93), while 1.1% (1 of 93) obtained a disclaimer of audit 
opinion. A total of 2.2% (2 of 93) of departments had outstanding audits. None of the 
departments obtained an adverse audit opinion. The definition of each type of external 
audit opinion is presented in Section 1.1.  
 
This section reviewed the results of descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies of 
the four factor variables formed using CATPCA. The next section presents and 
interprets the results obtained from the multivariate ordinal logistic regression as a 
statistical technique used to test the hypotheses developed during further data 
analysis, presented in Section 4.2.  
 
4.4  PHASE 3: MULTIVARIATE ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
 
Multivariate ordinal logistic regression was employed to test the four hypotheses 
developed in Section 4.2.1. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated in order 
to ensure that no multicollinearity exists between the factor variables to be used in the 
multivariate ordinal logistic regression. Firstly, Table 4.8 presents the results of the 
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Pearson correlation coefficients for the factor variables in the form of a correlation 
matrix, indicating the inter-correlation among the four factor variables (Hair et al. 
2010:92). A correlation coefficient of a positive or negative 1 indicates a perfect 
correlation, while a correlation coefficient of 0 indicates that there is no relationship. 
 
Table 4.8: Pearson correlation coefficients 
Factor variables 
AC 
statutory 
reporting 
oversight 
AC risk 
and control 
oversight 
AC 
assurance 
effectiveness 
oversight 
AC 
structure 
and profile 
AC statutory reporting 
oversight 
1    
AC risk and control 
oversight 
0.389 1   
AC assurance 
effectiveness oversight 
0.056 0.109 1  
AC structure and 
profile 
0.24 0.136 0.214 1 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.8 shows that the highest correlation between the factor variables existed 
between “AC statutory reporting oversight” and “AC risk and control oversight”, with a 
coefficient of 0.389; this association is considered relatively weak. The results, 
therefore, can be construed to indicate that little to no multicollinearity existed among 
the factor variables, and therefore all the factor variables can be included in the 
regression analysis.  
 
Secondly, Table 4.9 presents the results of the “goodness-of-fit” test for using the 
ordinal logistic regression model, based on the Deviance and Pearson chi-square 
tests. These tests determine whether multivariate ordinal logistic regression is 
appropriate for the data. If the results of the “goodness-of-fit” tests are found to be 
non-significant, multivariate ordinal logistic regression fits the data well (Kemalbay & 
Korkmazoğlu 2014:734).  
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Table 4.9: Goodness-of-Fit  
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Pearson 116.505 125 0.694 
Deviance 89.479 125 0.993 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.9 shows that both the Pearson Chi-square test [χ² (125) =116.505, p=0.694] 
and the Deviance test [χ² (125) =89.479, p=0.993] were not significant given that their 
p-values are greater than 0.05. Thus, both tests indicate multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression fits the data well. 
 
Thirdly, the multivariate ordinal logistic regression is employed to examine the 
relationship between a single independent variable and various other independent 
variables (Hair et al. 2010:161). One of the assumptions for this type of regression is 
one of proportional odds, indicating that the variables have the same effects when 
compared across the data (Osborne 2016:147; O’Connell 2006:3). When the result of 
the test of Parallel Lines indicate non-significance, it may be interpreted to mean that 
the variables have the same effects when compared across the data (O’Connell 
2006:3). 
 
Table 4.10: Test of parallel lines  
Test of Parallel Lines 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Chi-Square df 
Sig. 
(p-value) 
Null Hypothesis 127.963       
General 121.412 6.551 8 0.586 
Source: Author 
 
Table 4.10 indicates that the p-value of the Chi-Square test is 0.586, which is greater 
than 0.05, meaning it is not significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis for the test of 
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Parallel Lines is not rejected, reflecting that their proportional odds do exist; this 
implies that the factor variables have the same effects when compared across data. 
As the assumption is satisfied, multivariate ordinal logistic regression can be 
employed.  
 
Fourthly, in order to specifically test this study’s research hypotheses, the output from 
the multivariate ordinal logistic regression regarding each of the factor variables needs 
to be interpreted. Statistical significance in multivariate ordinal logistic regression is 
determined by using the Wald test or the Likelihood ratio to calculate the Chi-Squares. 
It is unclear which of the two tests mentioned is superior (Gudicha, Schmittmann & 
Vermunt 2017:1825). The use of the Likelihood ratio is typically associated with the 
test of both the null and alternative hypothesis models, while the Wald test is 
concerned with testing only the alternative hypothesis (Gudicha et al. 2017:1825). 
Thus, using only the Wald test might be less powerful. This study, therefore, applied 
both tests to determine the statistical significance of the multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression. Table 4.11 presents these results. 
 
Table 4.11: Likelihood ratio and Wald test Chi-squares  
Factor variables 
Likelihood Ratio Wald Test 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Sig. 
(p-value) 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Sig. 
(p-value) 
AC statutory 
reporting oversight 
1.827 1 0.177 1.800 1 0.180 
AC risk and control 
oversight 
0.211 1 0.646 0.211 1 0.646 
AC assurance 
effectiveness 
oversight 
0.590 1 0.442 0.588 1 0.443 
AC structure and 
profile 
5.250 1 0.022 5.324 1 0.021 
Source: Author 
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As shown in Table 4.11, small differences exist among the Chi-squares of the 
Likelihood Ratio and the Wald test. The p-values obtained from both tests confirm that 
the only factor variable with statistical significance in influencing the odds of obtaining 
an unqualified opinion with no findings in central government departments is “AC 
structure and profile” (p-value = 0.021).  
Table 4.12 presents further results of the multivariate ordinal logistic regression using 
odds ratios.  
 
Table 4.12: Odds ratios from the multivariate ordinal logistic regression 
Parameter B 
Std. 
Error 
Exp 
(B) 
95% Wald 
Confidence 
Interval for Exp 
(B) 
Lower Upper 
Threshold 
[Audit opinion 
=1.00] 
-0.836 0.9592 0.434 0.066 2.841 
[Audit opinion 
=3.00] 
0.778 0.8886 2.176 0.381 12.420 
[Audit opinion 
=4.00] 
3.523 0.9702 33.874 5.059 226.818 
AC statutory reporting oversight 0.282 0.2100 1.325 0.878 2.000 
AC risk and control oversight -0.080 0.1749 0.923 0.655 1.300 
AC assurance effectiveness 
oversight 
0.129 0.1687 1.138 0.818 1.584 
AC structure and profile 0.790 0.3424 2.203 1.126 4.311 
Source: Author 
 
The odds ratio is the probability of an event occurring or not occurring (Hair et al. 
2010:338). “The odds ratio gives the multiplicative change in the odds of success so 
that when its associated predictor increases, the probability of success increases if 
the parameter is positive and decrease in the opposite case” (Aguilera, Escabias & 
Valderrama 2006:1907). This implies that the odds or probability of obtaining an 
unqualified opinion with no findings increases when the odds ratio is greater than 1 
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and decreases if the odds ratio is less than 1. More specifically, an odds ratio higher 
than 1 suggests that the probability of obtaining an unqualified opinion with no findings 
increases (or more variables in that factor variable are disclosed) as the value of an 
independent variable increases, whereas an odds ratio less than 1 suggests a 
decreasing probability of obtaining an unqualified opinion with no findings that the 
value of an independent variable increases (or more variables in that factor variable 
are disclosed). The odds ratio, represented by Exp (B) in Table 4.12, therefore reflects 
that the multiplicative change in the odds of receiving a better audit opinion for every 
unit increase in the specific factor variable (more variables disclosed), holding the 
remaining factor variables constant. 
 
From the results in Table 4.12, the only factor variable found to be statistically 
significant is “AC structure and profile”, with an odds ratio of 2.203. This ratio indicates 
that the odds of receiving an unqualified opinion with no findings increases by a factor 
of 2.203 for every unit increase in disclosure of “AC structure and profile”. An increase 
in the factor variable “AC structure and profile” requires an increase in the number of 
disclosures by the departments of the three individual independent variables 
subsumed in the factor variable. This would result in an increased probability of 
receiving an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
The remaining multivariate ordinal logistic regressions of the other factor variables are 
also interpreted using the odds ratio, despite them not being statistically significant 
predictors of the type of audit opinion expressed. For “AC assurance effectiveness 
oversight” and “AC statutory reporting oversight” the odds of receiving an unqualified 
opinion with no findings increases by a factor of 1.138 and 1.325, respectively, for 
every unit increase in disclosures of the subsumed individual independent variables 
by the departments. However, increased disclosures about “AC risk and control 
oversight” is unlikely to have any influence on the external audit opinion expressed, 
as it has an Exp (B) value below 1. Given that this odds ratio is very close to 1, this 
implies changes in disclosure patterns will have little to no predicted effect on the 
likelihood of changing the type of audit opinion expressed.  
 
The 95% Wald confidence level is used as a measure of the likelihood or unlikelihood 
of a variable being statistically significant (Battle & Rakow 1993:78). Considering the 
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95% Wald confidence interval, there is some probability that if any additional individual 
independent variables are disclosed across all four factor variables, the department 
might obtain an unqualified opinion with no findings. As illustrated in Table 4.10, even 
the factor variables that did not have a statistically significant effect on the type of 
external audit opinion expressed, namely “AC statutory reporting oversight”, “AC risk 
and control oversight” and “AC assurance effectiveness oversight”, had upper 95% 
Wald confidence levels above 1.  
 
In this section, the results revealed a probability that all four hypotheses support a 
positive association between each of the factor variables and the probability of an 
unqualified opinion with no findings. However, only one factor variable, namely “AC 
structure and profile”, had a statistically significant impact on the type of audit opinion 
expressed. The next section provides additional observations identified during data 
collection.  
 
4.5  ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The National Treasury Regulations require central government departments to 
disclose the remuneration of all members of a audit committee in the notes to the 
financial statements of the departments (RSA 2005: Section 20.2.4). In the process of 
analysing the annual reports, the researcher observed that the central government 
departments did not disclose the remuneration of the audit committee members as 
required by legislation. Upon inspection of the annual report template issued by the 
National Treasury to the departments, it was further noted that the remuneration of the 
audit committee members was not included as a disclosure item. 
 
This implies that not all legislated disclosure requirements are contained in the annual 
reporting templates of the National Treasury provided to the departments, which may 
explain shortcomings in disclosure.  
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4.6  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, the data analysis and interpretation of the results of the two phases 
were presented. Phase 2 presented the results of the CATPCA and descriptive 
statistics on newly formed factor variables. Four factor variables were formed using 
CATPCA. Based on the results of the additional descriptive statistics, the central 
government departments’ disclosure was concerning, as 13 of the 14 audit committee 
effectiveness variables were legislated but partially disclosed by the majority of 
departments. Most departments disclosed most of the individual variables subsumed 
in the “AC structure and profile” factor variable.  
 
Phase 3 presented the results of multivariate ordinal logistic regression analysis for 
hypotheses testing. The results of the hypotheses tests indicated that “AC structure 
and profile” was the only factor which had a statistically significant association with 
unqualified opinion with no findings. The results further indicated that the factors “AC 
statutory reporting oversight”, “AC risk and control oversight” and “AC assurance 
effectiveness oversight” did not have a statistically significant association with an 
unqualified opinion with no findings, however, some probability of positive association 
between these factor variables and an unqualified opinion was found when 
considering the 95% Wald test confidence interval. Thus, the results provided 
evidence of having a positive association between disclosed audit committee 
effectiveness variables and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
The next chapter will provide the recommendations and conclusions of this study.  
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter 4 presented the research results and the interpretation of the results. This 
chapter includes an overview of the study, which briefly summarises the purpose and 
conclusion of each chapter, followed by a section providing a summary of the results 
on how the primary objective was achieved. Thereafter, the limitations and 
recommendations of the study are presented, along with some concluding remarks. 
 
5.2  OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY  
 
Chapter 1 provided the background of audit committees in South Africa and the 
challenges faced by the South African public sector audit committees. The stated aim 
and primary objective of the study was: “to determine the relation between disclosed 
audit committee effectiveness variables and the external audit opinion expressed in 
the South African central government departments”. The significance of disclosures of 
audit committee effectiveness variables in the context of the audit committee’s 
responsibility for oversight of financial reporting and assurance processes were 
explained. Particularly, the impact of audit committee effectiveness on the type of 
external audit opinion expressed, as a proxy of financial reporting quality, was 
underlined. In order to gain an understating of current disclosure practices of audit 
committee effectiveness variables, a review of South African literature was provided.  
 
The South African King III Code (IODSA 2009a) and Reports were regarded as the 
best practice for corporate governance at the time when the annual reports used by 
this study were downloaded and analysed. In order to address the primary objective 
of this study, two secondary objectives were formulated as follows:  
 
1. To analyse the King III Code for variables associated with audit committee 
effectiveness.  
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2. To analyse annual reports of central government departments for the disclosure 
or non-disclosure of variables associated with audit committee effectiveness 
(as identified in secondary objective 1).  
 
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the relevant literature on audit committee 
effectiveness. The agency theory perspective was applied as the audit committee is 
recognised as a corporate governance mechanism that addresses the risks inherent 
in the separation of control between agents (management) and principals 
(shareholders). In particular, audit committee characteristics and the oversight of 
financial reporting and assurance processes as proxies for audit committee 
effectiveness were considered. The audit committee characteristics that were 
discussed included independence, financial expertise, number of meetings, size of the 
audit committee and the audit committee chair. Furthermore, audit committee 
oversight of the financial reporting and assurance processes, which include the 
external audit function, the internal audit function and risk management were also 
identified as variables influencing financial reporting quality. Thus, the literature 
suggested that audit committee characteristics and oversight of financial reporting and 
assurance processes influence the type of external audit opinion expressed, as a 
proxy of financial reporting quality.  
 
Chapter 3 presented the research methodology employed to address the primary and 
secondary objectives of this study. Research processes, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, 
included the research philosophy, research design and research methods. The 
positivist approach was motivated and considered. To meet the objectives of this 
study, quantitative content analysis was employed as the initial research method. 
Annual reports from 93 central government departments (national and provincial 
departments) were analysed and coded in a spreadsheet containing 49 audit 
committee effectiveness variables. These 49 audit committee effectiveness variables 
were extracted from the King III Code (IODSA 2009a), and are presented in Appendix 
A.  
 
Data analysis comprised three phases. For Phase 1, the literature on descriptive 
statistics in the form of frequencies was discussed and the results of descriptive 
statistics were presented and interpreted. The results of the descriptive statistics 
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revealed that only 14 of the 49 individual independent audit committee effectiveness 
variables indicated potential significant variation. Thus, these 14 individual 
independent audit committee variables were used for further data analysis. For Phase 
2, the literature on factor analysis using CATPCA and hypothesis development were 
discussed and motivated as a statistical analysis method employed in this study. 
Lastly, for Phase 3, the literature on multivariate ordinal logistic regression was 
presented and motivated as a statistical analysis method for this study.  
 
Chapter 4 provided and interpreted the results of Phases 2 and 3’s data analysis. The 
results of Phase 2 were divided into two sub-sections, namely factor variable formation 
using CATPCA, and further descriptive statistics on the factor variables that were 
formed. Four factor variables were formed by considering factor loadings. All four 
factor variables satisfied the assumptions of factor analysis which include eigenvalue 
greater than 1 and Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients greater than 0.6. The four factor 
variables each had a factor loading above 0.5, meaning they were significant. The four 
factor variables were formed and labelled as follows: 
 
1. AC statutory reporting oversight (3 variables) 
2. AC risk and control oversight (4 variables) 
3. AC assurance effectiveness oversight (4 variables) 
4. AC structure and profile (3 variables) 
 
The second sub-section of Phase 2 included descriptive statistics on the factor 
variables formed from the CATPCA. The results of the descriptive statistics indicated 
that the majority of central government departments did not meet the expectation of 
disclosing all individual independent audit committee effectiveness variables, 
regardless of the fact that 13 of 14 variables must be disclosed in terms of legislation. 
Two of the three individual independent variables subsumed in the “AC structure and 
profile” factor variable were disclosed by almost all the departments.  
 
The following four hypotheses were developed using the factor variables as inputs 
(independent variables): 
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H1 There is a positive association between AC statutory reporting oversight 
and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
H2 There is a positive association between AC risk and control oversight and 
an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
H3 There is a positive association between AC assurance effectiveness 
oversight and an unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
H4 There is a positive association between AC structure and profile and an 
unqualified opinion with no findings.  
 
In Phase 3, the results of multivariate ordinal logistic regression were presented and 
interpreted. The summary of the results is discussed in the next section, indicating 
how the primary objective of this study was addressed and achieved.  
 
5.3  PRIMARY RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS  
 
This section summarises how the results meet the primary objective of this study, 
namely:  
 
To determine the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness variables 
and the external audit opinion expressed in South African central government 
departments. 
 
To achieve the primary objective, four hypotheses were developed from initial data 
analysis and tested during further data analysis. All four hypotheses revealed at least 
some probability of positive association between disclosures of audit committee 
effectiveness variables and an unqualified opinion with no findings. Only one of the 
factor variables, namely “AC structure and profile” had a statistically significant positive 
association between disclosures of the subsumed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and an unqualified opinion with no findings. The other three factor variables, 
namely “AC statutory reporting oversight”, “AC risk and control oversight” and “AC 
assurance effectiveness oversight” did not have a statistical significant relation, but 
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upon reviewing the confidence intervals had some probability of a positive association 
between disclosures of audit committee effectiveness variables and an unqualified 
opinion with no findings. 
 
Overall, the results of this study indicated that all the factor variables could be 
predictors of the type of external audit opinion expressed. The results of this study are 
important as there is currently no study that has statistically considered the impact of 
all the potential audit committee effectiveness variables (independent variables) on 
the external audit opinion expressed, as a proxy of financial reporting quality, in the 
South African central government departments.  
 
5.4  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
This study used a purposive sampling approach to select departments within the South 
African central government, therefore, the results cannot be generalised to other audit 
committees. Future studies could use statistical sampling techniques to achieve 
generalisable results. This study focused on the disclosure of audit committee 
effectiveness variables based on the King III Code (2009a) recommended practices, 
which was the relevant governance code at the time of data analysis. Future studies 
could investigate the relation between the disclosure of audit committee effectiveness 
variables based on King IV recommended practices.  
 
In Phase 1 of data analysis, the study identified 22 audit committee effectiveness 
variables which were not disclosed by any of the central government departments, two 
variables which were disclosed by less than 2% of the departments, and 11 variables 
which were disclosed by 97.8% of the departments. As these variables had no 
statistically significant variation, they were not analysed further. Future studies could 
address these variables.  
 
5.5  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
 
The results of this study indicated that disclosures of the audit committee effectiveness 
variables in the annual reports of central government departments are not in 
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compliance with the requirements of the PFMA and National Treasury Regulations. 
Moreover, the absent disclosure predicts the potential for less favourable external 
audit opinions, thus decreasing financial reporting quality. The main recommendations 
arising from this study are thus as follows:  
 
 The National Treasury should assist and oversee:  
o Management’s implementation of financial reporting processes aimed at meeting 
the legal disclosure requirements stipulated in the PFMA and National Treasury 
Regulations for audit committees.  
o The National Treasury should align their disclosure templates to include all legal 
disclosures for audit committees. 
o The National Treasury’s oversight of management’s performance should 
address adherence to legal disclosure requirements for audit committees.  
 The audit committee should acquire training when needed about their oversight and 
reporting responsibilities of financial reporting and assurance processes. 
 
5.6  CONCLUSION  
 
This study investigated the relation between disclosed audit committee effectiveness 
variables and the external audit opinion expressed, as a proxy of financial reporting 
quality, in the South African central government departments. A positive relation was 
found between increased disclosure of audit committee effectiveness variables and 
an unqualified opinion with no findings. This implies that the disclosure of audit 
committee effectiveness variables predicted the type of external audit opinion 
expressed. Overall, the results indicated that departments with more complete 
disclosures of audit committee effectiveness variables were more likely to obtain an 
unqualified opinion with no findings.  
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APPENDIX A: KING III CODE RECOMMENDED AUDIT COMMITTEE 
EFFECTIVENESS VARIABLES CODED DURING CONTENT 
ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL REPORTS 
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No  King III Code: Recommended 
practices  
Recommended 
practice 
number 
Aspect coded during 
content analysis of 
annual reports  
Principle 3.1 
1 Listed and state-owned 
companies must establish an 
audit committee  
3.1.1 Existence of the audit 
committee 
2 All other companies should 
establish an audit committee and 
define its composition, purpose 
and duties in the memorandum 
of incorporation 
3.1.2 Existence of the audit 
committee 
3 The board should approve the 
audit committee's terms of 
reference  
3.1.3 Approval of terms of 
reference 
4 The audit committee should 
meet as often as is necessary to 
fulfil its functions but at least 
twice a year 
3.1.4 Number of audit committee 
meetings 
5 The audit committee should 
meet with internal auditors at 
least once a year without 
management 
3.1.5 Meetings between the 
audit committee and 
internal audit take place 
6 The audit committee should 
meet with external auditors at 
least once a year without 
management 
3.1.5 Meetings between the 
audit committee and 
external audit take place 
Principle 3.2 
7 All the members of the audit 
committee should be 
independent non-executive 
directors - for public sector the 
requirement is the majority of 
audit committee members 
should not be employed in the 
puplic sector  
3.2.1 
(Public sector: 
RSA 1999: 
Section 77(a) (ii)) 
Internal or external denoted 
next to each audit committee 
member's name 
8 The audit committee should 
consist of at least three 
members 
3.2.2 Number of audit committee 
members  
136 
 
9 The chairman of the board 
should not be the chairman of 
the audit committee 
3.2.3 Internal or external 
denoted next to the name 
of the audit committee 
chair  
10 The audit committee collectively 
should have sufficient 
qualifications and experience to 
fulfil its duties  
3.2.4 At least one member with 
an accounting related 
professional qualification  
11 The audit committee members 
should keep up-to-date with the 
developments affecting the 
required skill-set.  
3.2.5 Audit committee 
workshops attended / 
professional designations 
which imply a continuing 
professional development 
requirement 
12 The audit committee should be 
permitted to consult with the 
specialist or consultants subject 
to board approval process  
3.2.6 Statement specifying 
consultation / outsourcing 
by audit committee 
13 The board must fill any 
vacancies on the audit 
committee  
3.2.7 
(Public sector: 
RSA 2005: 
Section 3.1.2) 
Statement that the 
accounting officer in 
consultation with the 
executive authority fills 
vacancies  
Principle 3.3 
14 The board should elect the chair 
of the audit committee 
3.3.1 
(Public sector: 
RSA 2005: 
Section 3.1.2) 
Accounting officer in 
consultation with the 
executive authority 
appointed the chair of the 
audit committee  
15 The chair of the audit committee 
should participate in setting and 
agreeing the agenda of the 
committee 
3.3.2 Statement specifying the 
chair's setting of the 
agenda 
16 The chair of the audit committee 
should be present at the annual 
general meeting 
3.3.3 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sectori 
Principle 3.4 
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17 The audit committee should 
have regard to all factors and 
risks that may impact on the 
integrity of the integrated report 
3.4.1 Coded as -1 as integrated 
reports are not required in 
the public sector 
18 The audit committee reviews and 
comments on the financial 
statements included in the 
integrated report 
3.4.2 Statement that the audit 
committee reviewed / 
evaluated / commented on 
the annual report 
19 The audit committee should 
review the disclosure of 
sustainability issues in the 
integrated report to ensure that it 
is reliable and does not conflict 
with the financial information  
3.4.3 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
20 The audit committee should 
recommend to the board to 
engage an external assurance 
provider on material 
sustainability issues  
3.4.4 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
21 The audit committee should 
consider the need to issue 
interim results  
3.4.5 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
22 The audit committee should 
review the content of the 
summarised information.  
3.4.6 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
23 The audit committee should 
engage the external auditors to 
provide assurance on the 
summarised information. 
3.4.7 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
Principle 3.5 
24 The audit committee should 
ensure that the combined 
assurance received is 
appropriate to address all the 
significant risks facing the 
company.  
3.5.1 Statement about combined 
assurance  
25 The relationship between the 
external assurance providers 
and the company should be 
monitored by the audit 
committee. 
3.5.2 Statement that the audit 
committee monitors 
external assurance 
providers  
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Principle 3.6 
26 Every year a review of the 
finance function should be 
performed by the audit 
committee. 
3.6.1 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
27 The results of the review (of the 
finance function) should be 
disclosed in the integrated 
report. 
3.6.2 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
Principle 3.7 
28 The audit committee is 
responsible for the appointment 
and/or dismissal of the chief 
audit executive.  
3.7.1 Statement that the audit 
committee appoints / 
dismisses the chief audit 
executive / internal audit 
head  
29 The audit committee is 
responsible for the performance 
assessment of the chief audit 
executive.  
3.7.1 Statement that the audit 
committee assesses the 
performance of the chief 
audit executive / internal 
audit head  
30 The audit committee should 
approve the internal audit plan 
3.7.2 Statement that the audit 
committee approved the  
internal audit plan 
31 The audit committee ensures 
that the internal audit function is 
subject to independent quality 
review as and when the 
committee determines it 
appropriate 
3.7.3 Statement that the audit 
committee requires an 
independent quality review 
of the internal audit 
function 
Principle 3.8 
32 The charter of the audit 
committee should set out its 
responsibility regarding risk 
management  
3.8.1 Statement explaining the 
audit committee's risk 
management oversight 
33 The audit committee should 
specifically have oversight of: 
financial reporting risks  
3.8.2.1 Statement explaining the 
audit committee's financial 
reporting risk oversight 
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34 The audit committee should 
specifically have oversight of: 
internal financial controls  
3.8.2.2 Statement explaining the 
audit committee's internal 
financial controls oversight  
35 The audit committee should 
specifically have oversight of: 
fraud risks as it relates to 
financial reporting  
3.8.2.3 Statement explaining the 
audit committee's fraud, 
risk pertaining to financial 
reporting oversight 
36 The audit committee should 
specifically have oversight of: 
information technology as it 
relates to financial reporting   
3.8.2.4 Statement explaining the 
audit committee's 
information technology, 
pertaining to financial 
reporting oversight 
Principle 3.9.1 
37 The audit committee: must 
nominate the external auditors 
for appointment 
3.9.1 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
38 The audit committee must 
approve the terms of 
engagement and remuneration 
of external auditor  
3.9.2 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
39 The audit committee must 
monitor and report on 
independence of the external 
auditor 
3.9.3 Statement explaining that 
the audit committee 
monitors and reports on 
the independence of the 
external auditors 
40 The audit committee must define 
policy for non-audit services by 
the external auditors and must 
approve the contracts for non-
audit services 
3.9.4 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
41 The audit committee should be 
informed of reportable 
irregularities identified and 
reported on by external auditor 
3.9.5 Statement explaining that 
the external auditors report  
reportable irregularities to 
the audit committee  
42 The audit committee should 
review the quality and 
effectiveness of external audit 
process 
3.9.6 Statement explaining that 
the audit committee 
reviews the external audit 
process and quality 
Principle 3.10 
140 
 
43 The audit committee should 
report to the board on its 
statutory duties and duties 
assigned to it by the board 
3.10.1 Statement explaining that 
the audit committee reports 
to the executive authority 
on its duties 
44 The audit committee must report 
to the shareholders on its 
statutory duties.  
3.10.2.1 Statement in the annual 
report explaining the audit 
committee's duties 
45 The audit committee should 
report to the shareholders on its 
statutory duties: if the committee 
is satisfied with the 
independence of the external 
auditors  
3.10.2.2 Statement in the annual 
report explaining the audit 
committee's satisfaction 
with the independence of 
the external auditors 
46 The audit committee should 
report to the shareholders on its 
statutory duties: audit 
committee's view on financial 
statements and accounting 
practices 
3.10.2.3 Statement in the annual 
report explaining the audit 
committee's view on 
financial statements and 
accounting practices 
47 The audit committee should 
report to the shareholders on its 
statutory duties: whether internal 
financial controls are effective 
3.10.2.4 Statement in the annual 
report explaining the audit 
committee's view on the 
effectiveness of internal 
financial controls  
48 The audit committee provides a 
summary of its role and details 
on its composition, number of 
meetings and activities in the 
integrated report 
3.10.3 Table presenting the 
details of the list of audit 
committee members, their 
qualifications, number of 
meetings and attendance 
thereof by each member  
49 The audit committee should 
recommend the integrated report 
for approval by the board 
3.10.4 Coded as -1 as this 
requirement does not apply 
to the public sector 
Source: Adapted from (IODSA 2009a: Principle 3.1-3.10) 
i Some audit committee effectiveness variables in the King III Code do not apply to the public sector. 
However, they were retained in this study’s analysis for the sake of considering a complete list of best 
practice recommended practices. 
                                            
